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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to study differences between female and male CEOs and to 
examine whether CEO’s gender has explanatory power over firm performance. The prior 
research has documented a relationship between top management’s gender diversity and 
firm performance (for example, Khan and Vieito 2013; Huang and Kisgen 2013; Levi, Li 
and Zhang 2014; Faccio, Marchica and Mura 2016), however, most of the studies 
consider firm performance only from one or two perspectives. This study contributes to 
the previous literature by examining simultaneously firm performance from four different 
perspectives – profitability, mergers and acquisitions, corporate risk-taking and valuation. 
The study focuses on S&P 1500 firms during the period of January 2005-December 2015, 
and applies the difference-in-differences approach as the main empirical methodology.  
The empirical evidence of this thesis suggests that firms with a female CEO have higher 
overall profitability and lower earnings volatility than firms with a male CEO, on average. 
I measure firm’s overall profitability as return on assets (ROA) and earnings volatility as 
the volatility of ROA and net income. Interestingly, I document also that female CEOs 
are not associated with higher operational profitability, measured as EBITD on total 
assets, even though CEO’s gender is associated with the firm’s overall profitability. This 
finding suggests that the difference between female and male CEOs’ performance may 
result from three income statement items in which ROA and EBITD on total assets 
deviate from each other: interest, taxes and depreciations. Furthermore, I record that firms 
with a female CEO conduct less acquisitions, generate higher shareholder return in long-
term and have lower Tobin’s Q than firms with a male CEO, on average. This evidence, 
however, is weak and may suffer from endogeneity bias. 
______________________________________________________________________ 
KEYWORDS: CEO gender, Profitability, Mergers and acquisitions, Risk-taking, 
Valuation  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
According to the study of Catalyst (2016) there were only 23, or 4.6%, women among the 
S&P 500 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in September 2016. Even though the number 
of women CEOs has increased during the past decades, it still remains on a significantly 
low level (Catalyst 2016). Based on the recent studies, it seems that the gender gap in top 
management is not present only in the large listed U.S. companies, but also across the 
corporate universe. For example, during the period of 1999-2009 only 9.4% of small and 
mid-sized European companies1 had a female CEO, and in 2014 only 7.4% of 1,175,505 
Japanese companies had a female president (Faccio, Marchica and Mura 2016; Japan 
Times 2014). Furthermore, similar inequality is observed when studying other top 
management positions among the board of directors and top executive teams. In 2016, 
only 19.9% of the S&P 500 directors and 25.1% of the S&P 500 executives excluding 
CEOs were women (Catalyst 2016). Due to the persistency and extent of this 
phenomenon, it is meaningful to consider the possible reasons behind it. I identify four 
possible explanations for top management’s gender gap: shortage of suitable candidates, 
male CEOs’ superior managerial abilities, females’ self-selection and discrimination.  
Firstly, top management’s gender gap might result from the shortage of suitable women 
candidates, for example in terms of education or work experience. In the light of statistics, 
the lack of potential women CEOs with suitable educational background explains partly 
the gender gap. According to Fortune (2016), the three most common degrees for Fortune 
500 CEOs to hold are MBA degree (42.6%), only bachelor’s degree (29.8%) and other 
than MBA master’s degree (18.5%). In 1975, when the current S&P 1500 CEOs 
graduated on average, 45.4% of bachelor’s degree graduates and 46.3% of master’s 
degree graduates were women in the United States (National center for education 
statistics 1994: 245). The corresponding number of female MBA students in 1976 was 
only 21% (Reha 1979). These figures support the claim that the pool of prospective 
women CEOs is in fact smaller than the corresponding pool of men. However, the 
difference between gender pools is not as large as the difference between the acting 
women and men CEOs.  
Secondly, women might not be hired as CEOs over men due to male CEOs’ superior 
managerial abilities. However, in the light of the prior empirical evidence, male CEOs’ 
superior managerial abilities explain poorly the phenomenon. For example, previous 
                                                 
1 Faccio, Marchica and Mura’s (2016) study sample consists of 338,397 firm-year observations during the 
period of 1999-2009. 
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literature documents that female executives and directors are associated with better firm 
performance in terms of profitability, stock performance and corporate risk-taking 
(Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader 2003; Khan and Vieito 2013; Krishnan and Parsons 2008; 
Welbourne 1999; Faccio, Marchica and Mura 2016). Furthermore, previous literature 
reports that female executives conduct less-value destroying mergers and acquisitions 
than male executives (Huang and Kisgen 2013; Levi, Li and Zhang 2014). 
Lastly, the reason for low female representation in top management may lie in females’ 
self-selection or discrimination. That is, females may self-select different career paths and 
for example value more time with family than males. Alternatively, females might be 
discriminated by the board of directors or middle management already in an earlier point 
of their careers, and therefore miss the opportunity to obtain position in a top 
management. Unlike the previous explanations, possible self-selection and discrimination 
are not observed as easily in a numerical format. However, if the evidence of female 
executives and directors’ positive association with firm performance is reliable, and 
simultaneously, there is significantly low number of female CEOs, it implies that females’ 
self-selection and/or discrimination may explain part of the gender gap. This is because 
female executives’ better firm performance should lead to a greater number of female 
CEOs rather than a lower number, while the low number of female CEOs should imply 
that females are less competent as leaders than their male counterparts. The latter, 
however, contradicts with the prior empirical evidence. 
As the low number of female CEOs and their association with better firm performance 
are observed simultaneously, I conjecture that somehow biased executive selection 
process may lead to an “improved quality” of female CEOs. That is, due to biased 
selection process, male candidates obtain position as a CEO more likely than female 
candidates. Therefore, female candidates need to outperform their male counterparts to 
become selected, and as a result only the best female candidates will obtain position as a 
CEO. The ultimate reason(s) behind the possibly biased selection process I leave for 
further research. 
To illustrate this conjecture, consider the following example. There is a group of 200 CEO 
candidates of which 100 are women and 100 men. All candidates are ranked based on 
their score in performance measure X. If female and male candidates are equally good in 
X on average (and their score distributions are similar, for example, close to normal 
distribution), the top 100 candidates should include around 50 women and 50 men. That 
is, when the selection process is not biased.  
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When these top 100 candidates become CEOs and they are again evaluated based on 
performance measure X next year, there is no difference between female and male CEOs, 
assuming none of them have improved their skills. Thus, CEO’s gender does not explain 
the performance score. 
However, when the selection process is biased, and the group of top 100 candidates does 
not include 50 women and 50 men, but rather 5 women and 95 men, the result is different. 
When the best 5 female and the best 95 male candidates become CEOs, they are again 
evaluated one year after the first evaluation. Only this time, the female CEOs have higher 
score than male CEOs on average, and hence they are better than male CEOs on average. 
This is because their selected population had a higher average score in the first place 
(assuming the selected women are among the top female candidates). Therefore, a biased 
selection process leads to an “improved quality” of female CEOs, and thus, gender has 
explanatory power over the performance measure X.  
Figure 1. Hypothetical female and male candidates’ score distributions. 
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1.1. Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this thesis is to study differences between female and male CEOs and to 
examine whether CEO’s gender has explanatory power over firm performance. The study 
considers firm performance from four different perspectives – profitability, mergers and 
acquisitions, corporate risk-taking and valuation. 
Firstly, this thesis aims to study whether firms with a female CEO tend to outperform 
firms with a male CEO by examining firms’ profitability in terms of return on assets 
(ROA), and earnings before interest, taxes and depreciations (EBITD) on total assets. 
Secondly, the thesis aims to study the relationship between CEO gender and firm’s 
acquisition activity as well as firm’s long-term performance after the acquisition. The 
purpose is to find out whether female CEOs conduct less acquisitions than male CEOs, 
and whether acquisitions conducted by female CEOs create more long-term value for 
shareholders than acquisitions conducted by male CEOs. Thirdly, the thesis aims to study 
the difference between genders’ risk-taking behavior in corporate finance context by 
examining firm leverage and earnings volatility. Lastly, the thesis aims to study female 
CEOs’ impact on firms’ valuation measured as Tobin’s Q as well as firms’ long-term 
stock performance. 
This study contributes to the previous literature by studying the four different fields of 
firm performance simultaneously. To the best of my knowledge, there are no other studies 
that examine top executive’s gender’s impact on all four firm performance measures by 
applying the same data and same empirical methodologies. This study also contributes to 
the existing literature by considering a wide range of dependent variables, and by 
demonstrating new information in the light of dependent variables that have not been used 
by the previous literature. For example, I show that gender’s association with profitability 
is significant only on firm’s overall profitability level (ROA) but not on operational level 
(EBITD on total assets). Furthermore, I study gender’s impact on firm’s long-term share 
price performance after an acquisition in contrast to previous literature that focuses only 
on market reaction of the acquisition announcement. Finally, I contribute the previous 
literature by examining more recent data sample from the period of 2005-2015. 
1.2. Structure of the study 
This thesis is organized as follows. Chapter two presents financial theories that help to 
explain why executive’s gender may have an impact on firm performance. The chapter 
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considers the differences in genders’ decision-making process and their implications for 
the four different fields of firm performance – profitability, mergers and acquisitions, 
corporate risk-taking and valuation. The chapter provides an overview of agency theory, 
overconfidence, managerial hubris and risk aversion, as well as considers the theories’ 
sensitivity to executive’s gender. 
Chapter three provides an overview on the previous literature that focuses on top 
executives’ gender diversity. The chapter is divided into three subsections: gender 
diversity and firm performance, gender diversity and mergers and acquisitions, as well as 
gender diversity and risk-taking. The previous literature regarding gender diversity, 
profitability and valuation are combined as many researches investigate these dimensions 
together.  
Chapter four outlines the research hypotheses and sample data used in the study, as well 
as provides a summary of the data refining process. The chapter presents the dependent 
variables used in the study and justifies their use. Furthermore, the chapter considers 
possible endogeneity bias and its implications for the empirical research. Finally, the 
chapter outlines the applied empirical models. 
Chapter five presents the empirical results of the study. The results are divided into four 
subsections based on the firm performance field they represent. Finally, chapter six 
concludes the thesis.   
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2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Why should CEO’s gender help explain firm profitability, risk-taking, acquisitions 
activity or valuation? After all, under perfect capital markets, executives should make 
only decisions that aim to maximize firm’s shareholder value irrespective of their 
personal interest or characteristics (Faccio, Marchica and Mura 2016). Hence, executives’ 
genders should not have an impact on their decision-making process and the firm 
performance.  
Agency theory propose explanations that rationalize executives’ personal characteristics’ 
impact on their investment decisions. According to the agency theory, the separation of 
firm ownership and control gives a CEO an opportunity to maximize his/her personal 
interest over shareholders’ interest (Jensen and Meckling 1976). In such situation, CEO’s 
decisions may reflect his/her own preferences, personal strengths and characteristics 
rather than be based on rational shareholder value maximizing reasoning (Faccio et al. 
2016). 
Agency theory suggests also explanations how CEO’s gender may have an impact on 
firm’s performance in all four fields of this thesis – profitability, mergers and acquisitions, 
corporate risk-taking and valuation. For example, agency problems may decrease firm’s 
profitability or impact negatively its shareholder value, and hence its valuation level. 
Agency problems may also have an impact on corporate risk-taking and acquisition 
activity when CEO acts against the shareholders’ interest. (Brealey, Myers and Allen 
2011: 291-292.) 
The previous financial literature has widely studied the relationship between agency 
problems, firm performance and corporate governance mechanisms. For example, 
Bruton, Keels and Scifres (2002) study the association between firm performance and 
ownership concentration throughout the buyout cycle (public-private-public cycle of 
ownership) of the firm. They conclude that agency costs have explanatory power over 
firm performance as the level of managerial ownership is positively correlated with a 
firm’s performance variables. In accordance with agency theory, when managerial 
ownership increases, agency costs decrease and firm performance improves. (Bruton et 
al. 2002.) 
The previous literature has also recorded some evidence of the difference between 
genders’ agency costs. For example, Jurkus, Park and Woodard (2011) examine top 
management’s gender diversity’s impact on agency costs, and conclude that firms with 
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high gender diversity have lower agency costs than firms with low gender diversity. 
However, the result is not robust for possible endogeneity bias. Therefore, it might be that 
top management’s gender diversity decreases firm’s agency costs, or alternatively low 
agency cost firms tend to attract more diversified management teams. 
In addition to agency theory, there are other hypothesis and theories that help explain 
genders’ differences in firm performance. Additional explanations include for example 
the differences between genders’ overconfidence (Huang and Kisgen 2013; Malmendier 
and Tate 2005, 2008), managerial hubris (Roll 1986), risk aversion (Powell and Ansic 
1997; Olsen and Cox 2001) and compensation structure (Khan and Vieito 2013). 
Overconfidence and hubris are often associated to explain executives’ motivation to 
pursue mergers and acquisitions, while the difference between gender’s risk aversion and 
compensation structure may offer explanations for CEO’s impact on for example 
corporate risk-taking. Moreover, one possible explanation for the genders’ differences in 
firm performance might results from the biased selection process as discussed above. 
2.1. Agency theory 
Typically, when a firm grows and ages, its owners hire outside executives to manage the 
company for them, and simultaneously they separate the ownership and control of the 
firm. This separation may cause interest contradictions between the owner and the 
executive, referred as an agency problem (Berle and Means 1932). The core difficulty of 
the agency problem is the asymmetric information between the owner (principal) and 
executive (agent). Since the executives manage the company on a daily basis, they have 
more information about the firm and its actions than the owners have. (Brealey, Myers 
and Allen 2011: 460.) Consequently, the executives have an opportunity to act in their 
own interest at the owners’ costs.  
According to Berle and Means (1932), 
“Agency problems may, and often do, produce a condition where the interest 
of the owner and the ultimate executive conflicts and where the checks which 
formerly limited the use of the power disappear”. 
A large, publicly listed company stands as a classical example of agency problem. When 
the ownership of the company is distributed among hundreds of thousands of investors, 
of which most hold insignificant stake of the firm, the information asymmetry between 
the owners and management grows significant and management monitoring becomes 
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inefficient. (Brealey et al. 2011: 5.) Board of directors are usually elected to monitor the 
management (Brealey et al. 2011: 292), however, the board of directors are another hired 
agents, at least for the minority shareholders. 
Agency problem can be classified into two different types. Type I occurs between the 
owners and executives, while the type II occurs between the majority and minority 
shareholders. Type I agency problem arises when the interest of the owners and 
management are not aligned, and the management acts in their own interest at the owners’ 
expense. Type II agency problem occurs when large shareholders use their power to drive 
corporate policies that reduce the value of small shareholders’ ownership. (Ratnawati, 
Abdul-Hamid and Popoola 2016.) 
Agency costs 
Agency problems cause agency costs (Jensen and Meckling 1976). The costs occur in two 
ways: (1) when management does not maximize the shareholder value and (2) when the 
owners try to mitigate agency problems for example through monitoring. (Brealey et al. 
2011: 13.) According to Brealey et al. (2011: 291-292), management can cause agency 
costs for example by reducing effort, taking private benefits, building an empire, 
entrenching investment or by avoiding risk. 
Reducing effort – As top executives’ job description includes complicated and hard-to-
measure tasks, such as finding and executing shareholder value increasing projects, board 
of directors may not notice if the executives reduce their effort. The core problem of 
executives’ reduced effort is the asymmetric information between principal and agent: 
board of directors are unable to verify whether the executives are making genuinely their 
best effort or not. For example, board of directors do not know if the project recommended 
by the management is truly the most shareholder value increasing alternative, or whether 
the executives reduced their effort and recommend only a sufficient project. By reducing 
effort, an executive may cause agency costs through ignored value increasing 
opportunities, that in turn may have a negative impact on the firm’s performance. (Brealey 
et al. 2011: 291-292.) 
Taking private benefits – In addition to their formal compensation, executives may take 
private benefits at the company’s expense. For example, an executive may take private 
benefits by buying first-class flight tickets instead of sufficient economy class tickets. In 
some cases, of course, first-class flight tickets are justified, however, the owners may not 
know when. The issue of private benefits is thus the asymmetric information between 
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principal and agent of what is sufficient. By taking private benefits, executives cause 
unnecessary costs for the company. (Brealey et al. 2011: 291-292.) 
Building an empire – According to Brealey et al. (2011: 291), executives prefer to manage 
large companies rather than small ones. Therefore, executives may advocate mergers and 
acquisitions that increase the size of the firm they manage. Such behavior is referred as 
empire building (Brealey et al. 2011: 291). In empire building, executives pursue for 
mergers and acquisitions that are against shareholder’s interest and that destroy 
shareholder value. Empire building has negative net present value for the company as the 
acquisition costs do not exceed the potential synergy gains. (Brealey et al. 2011: 291.) 
This in turn may have negative implications for the firm’s performance, for example 
profitability and valuation (Fu 2010). In addition to executing unnecessary investments 
such as mergers and acquisitions, executives may also be reluctant to do disinvestments 
that decrease the size of their company (Brealey et al. 2011: 291).  
Entrenching investment – Entrenching investments refer to projects that are especially 
designed to require or reward the firm managements’ abilities and characteristics. In order 
to secure company’s need for the executive, she/he may promote projects that require the 
characteristics and abilities she/he has. Similarly as in the previous agency problems, 
entrenching investment may not be the best alternative for the company, or they may even 
have negative net present value and decrease the shareholder value. The investments are 
made in the interest of executives rather than shareholders. (Brealey et al. 2011: 291.) 
According to Brealey et al. (2011: 291-292) entrenching investments and empire building 
are typical symptoms of executives’ desire to overinvest. Brealey at al. (2011: 291-292) 
define overinvesting as an investing level where the net present value of the investments 
turn negative. In his seminal study, Jensen (1986) argues that firms with excess cash flow 
and limited investments opportunities are more likely to overinvest, and therefore execute 
acquisitions that destroy shareholder value. Jensen (1986) refers this as the free-cash-flow 
problem.  
Avoiding risk – The underlying problem of executives’ risk aversion is their contradicting 
interest with shareholders’ interest. An executive with fixed compensation has not much 
to win but a lot to lose in high-risk investment projects. This is because executive’s fixed 
compensation does not reward the executive’s when the project is successful but in case 
of an unsuccessful project the executive might be dismissed. Furthermore, executives 
cannot distribute their risk position as well as shareholders can: they can work only in one 
firm at the time, while shareholder may distribute their investments among hundreds of 
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firms. For these reasons, executives may avoid risk at shareholders’ expense. (Brealey et 
al., 2011: 291-292.) 
Risk aversion may cause agency costs if value increasing investment opportunities are 
ignored. By choosing low-risk investment projects, the executive anchor the firm’s 
expected returns also low. This might be inefficient for shareholders as they can distribute 
their risk among hundreds of firms with thousands of projects. From the shareholders’ 
point of view, executives should maximize their firms’ risk-return relation, and thus 
executive’s risk aversion may not be in the interest of the shareholders. (Brealey et al. 
2011: 9-10.) 
Solutions to mitigate agency problems 
Agency problems arise from the interest contradiction and asymmetric information 
between the principal and agent (Brealey et al. 2011: 5, 460). Therefore, the solution to 
agency problem is to align agent’s interest with principal’s interest, and keep the principal 
informed about the agent’s actions. In other words, agency problem can be mitigated with 
correct incentives and monitoring (Brealey et al. 2011: 292-298).  
Executives’ incentives should be designed in such way that it motivates them to act in the 
shareholders’ interest. Especially the structure of the compensation is crucial for right 
incentives. Executives’ compensation may consist of base salary, performance-based 
bonuses, equity-based compensation such as stock options, as well as other long-term 
incentives. (Brealey et al. 2011: 294-297.) According to Brealey et al. (2011: 294, 297), 
in many countries bonus and long-term incentives accounts for the most of the 
compensation in such way that the executives’ pays are linked to their performance. 
Executives’ performance is often measured as a firm value, however, the value is also 
effected by factors that are beyond executives’ control. Therefore, the fluctuation in firm 
value is shared among executives and shareholders: executives are willing to bear some 
firm value fluctuation that is beyond their control, and shareholder are willing to bear 
some firm value fluctuation caused by agency costs, that is, the executive’s failure to 
maximize the firm value. As a result, agency costs are mitigated but not eliminated. 
(Brealey et al. 2011: 296-297.) 
In addition to compensation structuring, agency cost can be mitigated with management’s 
monitoring. Typically, firms have a board of directors who represents the shareholders’ 
interest and monitor the management for them. However, the management is also 
monitored by the independent auditor, lenders such as banks as well as security analyst 
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(Brealey et al. 2011: 14, 292-293). Typically, board of directors delegate the monitoring 
of firm’s financials’ accuracy to the independent auditors, as they might not have the 
required skills and/or resources to do it themselves (Brealey et al. 2011: 292-293). 
According to Brealey et al. (2011: 292) efficient monitoring may reduce agency costs 
significantly. 
2.2. Overconfidence and managerial hubris 
Overconfidence 
Overconfidence is a common judgemental pattern in which a person is excessively 
confident in the precision of his/her beliefs and estimates (Bazerman and Moore 2009: 
36). Alpert and Raiffa (1969/1982) were first to record evidence on this confirmation 
heuristic bias by studying the accuracy of estimate ranges. Alpert and Raiffa (1969/1982) 
requested 100 persons to give estimate ranges of 10 predetermined quantities in such way 
that the person is 90 percent confident that the actual quantity is within the estimate range. 
They find that 42.6 percent of the quantities were outside the estimate ranges implying 
that test persons’ precision was 57.4 percent instead of the instructed 90 percent (Alpert 
and Raiffa 1969/1982). 
Overconfidence bias is based on confirmation heuristic (Bazerman and Moore 2009: 37). 
In this heuristic, people search for conforming evidence for their beliefs and conclusions, 
and give contradictive evidence less attention (Nickerson, 1998). When people assess 
their confidence in the estimate range, they generate more supporting than opposing 
evidence for their estimates. Based on the supporting evidence, they make conclusion that 
their estimates are good, and therefore end up being excessively confident of the precision 
of the estimate range. (Bazerman and Moore 2009: 37.) 
While overconfidence is beneficial for our endeavours, it also distorts our professional 
judgement. This is because overconfident persons ignore new evidence and alternative 
perspectives. (Bazerman and Moore 2009: 37.) Previous literature finds evidence of 
overconfidence’s disadvantages in financial context. For example, Odean (1999) 
proposes that overconfident investors are too optimistic of their ability to assess over- and 
underperforming securities and therefore lose more money on transaction costs than they 
win by active trading. According to Odean (1999), overconfident investors lose on 
average more than four percentage points of their annually return due to trading costs. 
Furthermore, Malmendier and Tate (2005, 2008) conclude that executives’ 
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overconfidence has explanatory power over the value destroying mergers and 
acquisitions. That is, the overconfident executives are more likely to conduct value-
destroying acquisitions due to their misevaluation. 
The previous literature has also found evidence on genders’ different tendencies to be 
overconfident. For example, Odean (1999) record the difference between female and 
male investors’ trading activity – men trade 45 percent more actively than women. This 
implies that men are more overconfident than women if active trading is considered as a 
sign of an overconfidence. In addition, Huang and Kisgen (2013) find supporting 
evidence that female executives are less overconfident than male executives. They 
document the difference in female and male executives’ overconfidence by studying their 
confidence in earnings estimate ranges and early option exercise (Huang and Kisgen 
2013). 
Managerial hubris 
Managerial hubris refers to management’s excessive optimism of their abilities as well as 
arrogance (Horton 1990) and is therefore associated closely with overconfidence. In his 
seminal study, Roll (1986) introduces the term of Hubris Hypothesis to explain corporate 
takeover phenomenon. According to the hypothesis, over-optimistic executives pursue 
for mergers and acquisitions because they overestimate the possible acquisition synergies 
and the overall value of the target company (Roll 1986).  
Roll (1986) suggests that over-optimistic executives believe that the value of the target 
company is underestimated, and that under their management, the value of the company 
will increase. They believe that target company’s management is inefficient, and that with 
their abilities potential synergy gains will materialise. For this reason, over-optimistic 
executives are likely to pay too much of the target company, especially when they are 
competing with other bidding party. This overpayment in turn may result in winner’s 
curse and the firm’s value destruction. (Roll 1986.) Winner’s curse refers to bid-winning 
party’s overpayment of a certain asset due to value overestimation (Capen, Clapp and 
Campbell 1971). 
Hubris Hypothesis assumes that financial markets are efficient and consistent with the 
strong-form of Efficient Market Hypothesis (Roll 1986). The strong-form of Efficient 
Market Hypothesis implies that all available information is incorporated into the security 
prices, and hence, abnormal returns do not exist (Fama 1965). In addition, the Hubris 
Hypothesis assumes that product and labour markets are efficient in a sense that 
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reorganization of the target company will not improve operational efficiency and that its 
management’s abilities are employed as well as possible (Roll 1986). 
In case of a strong market efficiency, the security prices reflect their underlying assets’ 
fair value. Rational shareholders will not accept a bid that is under the fair value, and 
therefore, a bidder must offer the market value exceeding price of the target company. 
However, this price will make sense for the bidder only in the case of potential synergy 
gains, which in turn, are elusive under efficient product and labour markets. As a result, 
the selling shareholders end up enjoying overvaluation at the bidder’s expense. In 
managerial hubris, over-optimistic executives destroy firm shareholder value by 
executing overestimated corporate takeovers, and hence, cause agency costs for the 
bidding company. (Roll 1986.)  
2.3. Risk aversion 
Traditionally, economists have explained risk aversion with expected utility theory (Rabin 
and Thaler 2001). According to the theory, a person’s preferences under uncertainty can 
be expressed with an expected utility function. The function describes the change in the 
level of utility the person experiences when his/her wealth changes. The function is 
concave for risk averse persons and convex for risk lovers. In contrast, risk neutral 
persons have linear expected utility functions. A concave function suggests that risk 
averse persons are not willing to take risk since their utility of the expected value of wealth 
is greater than the expected utility of wealth. The opposite is true for risk lovers, while 
risk neutral persons are indifferent between the two. (Varian 2010: 223-229.) Figure 2 
presents the expected utility functions of risk averse and risk loving persons.  
In contrast, Rabin and Thaler (2001) argue that expected utility theory is not plausible to 
explain risk aversion exhaustively. They argue that the theory captures the intuition 
behind the large wealth changing gambles, but not the most risk attitudes faced in the 
smaller choices (Rabin and Thaler 2001). According to Rabin and Thaler (2001), 
expected utility theory assumes that people’s risk aversion decreases when the wealth 
change is relative small compared to their lifetime wealth, and increases when the wealth 
change is relative large. They present opposite evidence and propose that this assumption 
is not credible in practice. Furthermore, they reason that the expected utility theory fails 
to explain the difference between people’s risk attitudes towards an independent gamble 
and an aggregation of independent gambles. (Rabin and Thaler 2001.) That is, a person 
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is more likely to refuse a single bet than a large number of same bets due to risk 
diversification (Samuelson 1963).  
 
Instead of expected utility theory, Rabin and Thaler (2001) suggest that loss aversion and 
mental accounting may help to explain risk aversion. Loss aversion, the essence of 
Kahneman and Tversky's (1979) prospect theory, refers to the people’s tendency to 
experience a loss more dramatically than equal-sized gain, while mental accounting refers 
to people’s propensity to assess and note financial transactions. Rabin and Thaler (2001) 
argue that loss aversion explains risk aversion when the expected values are considered 
as gains and losses: risk averse persons refuse even small bets with positive expected 
value because they weight more the probability of losing than the probability of winning. 
Mental accounting in turn, explains risk aversion since people tend to evaluate risk in 
isolation. For example, risk averse persons who do not accept a bet in which they win 
€150 and lose €75 with equal probabilities, are likely to accept a bet that increases their 
home’s equity by €150 or decreases it by €75 with equal probabilities. This is because 
they do not consider the risk to be the same due to mental accounting. (Rabin and Thaler 
2001.) According to Rabin and Thaler (2001), people would not be as risk averse as they 
are, if they considered the risk with a wider perception. 
Figure 2. Expected utility functions of risk averse and risk loving persons. 
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The previous literature has widely documented that women differ from men in their risk-
taking behavior not only in general, but also in economic and financial context. For 
example, Olsen and Cox (2001), Powell and Ansic (1997) and Fehr-Duda, De Gennaro 
and Schubert (2006) conclude that women are more cautious and risk averse than men in 
financial decisions. In more specific, Olsen and Cox (2001) examine gender’s impact on 
risk aversion among professional investors. They conclude that female investors tend to 
weight more the probability of loss and uncertainty than their male counterparts. Female 
investors are also more sensitive to construct investment portfolios with less risk. The 
findings are consistent after controlling for investors’ expertise and experience. (Olsen 
and Cox 2001.) Olsen and Cox (2001) conclude also that non-professional female 
investors are more risk averse than male investors when investor age, education, wealth 
and experience are controlled. 
Furthermore, Powell and Ansic (1997) conduct an experimental study to analyze the 
difference between female and male business school students’ risk aversion in financial 
decision-making and strategy construction. They document that female students are more 
risk averse in their financial decision-making than male students after controlling for 
investor’s familiarity, situation framing, trading costs and investment uncertainty (Powell 
and Ansic 1997). In addition, Powell and Ansic (1997) show that female student use 
different kind of financial strategies than male students, and that both genders’ strategies 
perform equally well.  
Finally, Fehr-Duda, De Gennaro and Schubert (2006) investigate gender’s difference in 
risk-taking behaviour, and document that women and men tend to process probabilities 
of gain and loss differently. They find that women are more likely to underestimate large 
probabilities of profit than men are. Based on this finding, they conclude that women are 
on average more pessimistic than men, and therefore possibly also more risk averse. 
(Fehr-Duda et al. 2006.)  
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3. PRIOR EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 
This chapter provides an overview of the prior studies that examine the impact of top 
management’s gender diversity on firm’s profitability, merger and acquisitions, corporate 
risk-taking and valuation. The earlier studies in this research field mainly focus on 
executive teams’ or board of directors’ gender diversity on a group level, while the more 
recent studies consider the gender of individual senior executives, such as CEOs or CFOs. 
Both group-focused and individual-focused studies are presented to provide 
comprehensive overview on prior empirical evidence. In addition, studies considering top 
management’s other personal characteristics and abilities in similar context is presented 
to complement the gender diversity research. This chapter is divided into three 
subsections based on the four different fields of firm performance. The first subsection – 
gender diversity and firm performance – presents the previous literature considering 
firm’s profitability and valuation as many studies investigated these dimensions together. 
3.1. Gender diversity and firm performance 
The previous literature focusing on top managements’ gender diversity and firm 
performance is to some extent contradictive. While most of the gender diversity studies 
conclude that female executives, directors and employees have positive impact on firm 
performance in terms of profitability and valuation (Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader 2003; 
Welbourne 1999; Catalyst 2004; Dwyer, Richard and Chadwick 2003; Smith, Smith and 
Verner 2006; Farrell and Hersch 2005; Krishnan and Parson 2008; Khan and Vieito 
2013), few studies find negative or neutral association between the two (Adams and 
Ferreira 2009; Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski and Atkins 2010; Chapple and 
Humphrey 2014). However, most of the opposing researches focus on the firm’s board of 
directors rather than management teams or individual executives. 
In most studies firm performance is defined as profitability, often measured as return on 
assets (ROA) or return on investments (ROI), and valuation, often measured as Tobin’s 
Q or the market value of equity. This section presents firstly the studies related to 
profitability, secondly the studies related to firm valuation and lastly the studies related 
to profitability, valuation and other personal characteristics than gender. 
Among first studies, Erhardt, Werbel and Shrader (2003), Welbourne (1999) and Catalyst 
(2004) conclude that gender diversity among firm’s top management has a positive 
impact on its profitability and valuation. In more specific, Erhardt et al. (2003) document 
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that female and other minority board members have positive impact on firm’s profitability 
by studying profitability of 127 large U.S. companies in years 1993-1998. Erhardt et al. 
(2003) measure firm’s profitability with return on assets (ROA) and return on investment 
(ROI) ratios. Catalyst (2004) and Welbourne (1999) in turn study top management’s 
gender diversity and measure firm profitability with return on equity (ROE) and earnings 
per share (EPS), respectively, as well as firm valuation as the long-term share price 
performance. 
However, Erhardt et al. (2003), Catalyst (2004) and Welbourne (1999) use only simple 
correlation and regression analyses to empirically study the relationship, and therefore 
ignore the possible endogeneity bias related to the data. That is, firms with higher gender 
diversity might be associated with higher profitability and valuation because they tend to 
attract more diversified management teams, and not because the more diversified 
management teams improve the firm’s profitability and valuation. In other words, by 
ignoring possible endogeneity issues, they are unable to investigate the causality of the 
association. 
Smith, Smith and Verner (2006) find similar results as Erhardt et al. (2003) after 
controlling for causality direction and taking into account possible endogeneity bias. 
Smith et al. (2006) investigate female executives’ and directors’ impact on firm’s 
profitability by studying 2,500 Danish firms during the period of 1992-2001, and show 
that each additional woman in top management and the first female board member 
improve firm’s profitability. Smith et al. (2006) control causality with instrumental 
variable approach, and they measure firm’s profitability with four different variables: (i) 
gross value added on net turnover, (ii) profit on ordinary operations divided by net 
turnover, (iii) ordinary result on net assets and (iv) net income on net assets. Smith et al. 
(2006) document that especially female CEOs with university degree have significant and 
positive impact on firm’s profitability.  
Farrell and Hersch (2005) also report that females tend to serve as directors in better 
performing firms. They complement the findings of Smith et al. (2006) by showing that 
adding a director into a board is not gender neutral. Farrell and Hersch (2005) document 
that the likelihood of adding a female director into a board is negatively associated with 
the number of current female directors. That is, the firms tend to favor male candidates 
over female candidates when there already are one or more women in the board. (Farrell 
and Hersch 2005.) 
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Dwyer, Richard and Chadwick (2003) contribute to the existing literature by examining 
a wide group of managers instead of only focusing on the top management of the firm. 
They document that gender diversity’s impact on firm’s profitability depends on the 
organizational context  ̶ growth orientated firms are more likely to benefit gender 
diversity. In addition, they show that an “appropriate” organizational culture enables the 
full utilization of the benefits of gender diversity. (Dwyer et al. 2003.) Dwyer et al. (2003) 
use hierarchical regression analysis as a methodology in their empirical study. 
Furthermore, Krishnan and Parson (2008) report that top management’s gender diversity 
has a positive impact on profitability and on post-IPO (Initial Public Offering) returns. 
They show that firms with more female executives tend to be more profitable and have 
higher stock returns after an IPO than companies with fewer female executives (Krishnan 
and Parson 2008). Krishnan and Parson (2008) also show that the quality of the earnings 
is higher for companies with more female executives. High quality of earnings refers to 
earnings that reflect accurately the financial state of the company (Krishnan and Parson 
2008). These findings are in line with previous studies which conclude that females are 
less likely to conduct financial crimes and frauds than males (Steffensmeier, Schwartz 
and Roche 2013; Cumming, Leung and Rui 2015). 
In contrast, Adams and Ferreira (2009) report opposing results. They document that 
gender diversity’s positive impact on firm performance is not robust for possible 
endogeneity bias. Instead, they show that the relationship between gender diversity, 
firm’s profitability and valuation is on average negative. (Adams and Ferreira 2009.) 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) argue that this negative impact is driven by firms that have 
strong shareholder rights, as female directors are able to provide value mainly for firms 
with weak shareholder rights. Based on these findings, Adams and Ferreira (2009) 
conclude that female directors improve board of directors’ monitoring abilities rather than 
firm profitability  ̶  in weakly monitored firms female directors improve firm monitoring 
in such way that it reaches the appropriate level, while in well monitored firms they 
increase it to a level which decreases efficiency. Dobbin and Jung (2010) find similar 
results, and conclude that diverse boards have no impact on firm’s profitability but they 
have a significant and negative impact on Tobin’s Q. 
In line with the results of Adams and Ferreira (2009), Haslam, Ryan, Kulich, Trojanowski 
and Atkins (2010) document that there is no relationship between female board members 
and firm performance by studying FTSE100 companies. Instead, they find that firms with 
male board members trade with a valuation premium of 37% in comparison to firms with 
female board members (Haslam et al. 2010). The findings imply that firm’s profitability 
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and valuation are not aligned, and therefore Haslam et al. (2010) argue that female 
directors tend to serve in firms with worse performance, and that investors undervalue 
those firms due to females’ presence in the board room.  
In addition, Chapple and Humphrey (2014) do not find a significant relationship between 
board diversity and firm stock performance by studying stock portfolios. However, they 
document a weak association between board of directors’ gender diversity and some 
industries, and a weak negative association between multiple female directors and firm 
valuation (Chapple and Humphrey 2014). Carter, D’Souza, Simkins and Simpson (2010) 
conclude also that there is no significant relationship between board of directors’ gender 
diversity and firm performance measured as ROA and Tobin’s Q.  
In a more recent study, Khan and Vieito (2013) investigate the relationship between CEO 
gender and firm performance by examining S&P 1500 firms over the period of 1992- 
2004. Khan and Vieito (2013) contribute to the existing literature by studying female 
CEOs instead of other female executives. In order to control causality, Khan and Vieito 
(2013) investigate the relationship between women CEOs and firm performance by 
applying instrumental variable approach. They use CEO’s tenure as well as board of 
directors’ meeting activity as instrumental variables based on Vafeas’ (1999) evidence of 
inverse relationship between the number of annual board meetings and firm performance. 
Khan and Vieito (2013) study CEO’s gender’s impact on firm’s profitability and risk-
taking, and conjecture that the difference between genders’ compensation may explain 
female CEOs association with lower corporate risk-taking. They measure firm’s 
performance as return on assets (ROA), firm’s risk level as the natural logarithm of share 
price volatility and CEO’s total compensation as of the sum of compensation components 
such as bonus, stock options, restricted stocks, long-term incentive plan and other 
compensations.  
Khan and Vieito (2013) conclude that firms managed by a female CEO tend to outperform 
firms managed by a male CEO. That is, firms with a female CEO are more profitable than 
firms with a male CEO on average. They also conclude that female CEOs tend to take 
less risk even though there is no significant difference between genders’ risk taking 
incentives such as stock option compensation. They reason these findings with the 
females’ greater risk aversion behavior documented by the previous research such as 
Vandergrift and Brown (2005) and Niessen and Ruenzi (2006). (Khan and Vieito 2013.) 
Instead of gender, Kaplan, Klebanov and Sorensen (2012) study CEO’s other personal 
characteristics’ impact on firm performance. They investigate private equity funds’ CEO 
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candidates during the period of 2000-2006 to uncover which CEO characteristics and 
abilities are positively associated with performance. They measure performance with 
three survey questions that are (1) whether the CEO candidate was hired, (2) whether the 
private equity fund invested in the company, and (3) whether the CEO and the portfolio 
company was successful (Kaplan et al. 2012). As private equity funds are reluctant to 
share any financial information of their portfolio companies, Kaplan et al. (2012) give 
values of 1, 0.5 and 0 for the survey answers regarding the performance. Value 1 
represents a successful, 0.5 a mediocre and 0 an unsuccessful CEO or a company. They 
document that a CEO who is efficient, persistent, aggressive, proactive, organized and 
committed, and who has high standards for performance and leadership abilities, is 
positively associated with success and firm performance. (Kaplan et al. 2012.) Kaplan et 
al. (2012) conclude that firm performance correlates with CEO’s abilities related to 
execution, resoluteness and overconfidence.  
3.2. Gender diversity and mergers and acquisitions 
The previous literature related to mergers and acquisitions is extensive, however, there 
are only few studies considering the impact of top management’s gender diversity on 
mergers and acquisitions. This section presents the prior studies in this field of research. 
In addition, this section presents the study of Malmendier and Tate (2008) to complement 
the findings related to gender diversity.  
Levi, Li and Zhang (2014) examine board of directors’ gender diversity and mergers and 
acquisitions by studying S&P 1500 firms over the period of 1997-2009. They focus on 
female directors’ impact on the firms’ acquisition activity and paid bid premium (Levi et 
al. 2014). Levi et al. (2014) use negative binomial regression with time and industry fixed 
effects, propensity-score matching and instrumental variable approaches as their 
empirical methodologies. They define instrumental variable as the fraction of firm’s male 
directors who are also directors in other firms’ boards with female directors. Levi et al. 
(2014) conjecture that boards with large fraction of male directors, who have female 
colleagues in other firms’ boards, are more likely to have more female directors than 
boards with small fraction of male directors with female colleagues. 
Levi et al. (2014) conclude that boards with female directors tend to make less 
acquisitions than all-male boards. They find that each additional female director decreases 
firm’s acquisition activity by 7.6 percentage points, and paid bid premium by 15.4 
percentage points (Levi et al. 2014). Levi et al. (2014) rationalize their findings with 
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males’ greater overconfidence. They conjecture that males tend to overestimate 
acquisition synergies more often than female directors due to their greater overconfidence 
(Levi et al. 2014).  
Furthermore, Huang and Kisgen (2013) examine the association between executive’s 
gender and the firm’s corporate finance decisions such as asset growth, acquisitions, 
leverage and debt issuance. They study NYSE-, Amex- and Nasdaq-listed firms with total 
assets greater than $500m during the period of 1993-2005. Due to the small number of 
female CEOs, they include also CFOs in their sample. (Huang and Kisgen 2013.) In order 
to mitigate possible endogeneity issues, Huang and Kisgen (2013) use a difference-in-
differences approach as their main methodology and complement it with a traditional 
panel data regression, a propensity score matching approach and an instrumental variable 
approach. 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) report that female executives differ from male executives in 
their corporate financial decision-making. They document that firms with a female CEO 
or CFO are less likely to conduct acquisitions and issue debt than firms with a male 
executive. They also show that market reaction for female executives’ acquisition and 
debt issuance announcements is positive, that female executives are more likely to retain 
their position longer, and that female executives are less overconfident than male 
executives in terms of earnings estimate spread and early option exercise on average. 
(Huang and Kisgen 2013.) Huang and Kisgen (2013) rationalize their findings with male 
executives’ greater overconfidence and conclude that gender should be taken into account 
when studying firm’s behavior in capital structure and acquisitions decision-making. 
Malmendier and Tate (2008) investigate the relationship between CEO overconfidence 
and mergers and acquisitions by studying 477 large publicly traded U.S. companies 
during the period of 1980-1994. They measure CEO overconfidence by using CEO’s 
personal investment in the firm and CEO’s popularity in media as proxies (Malmendier 
and Tate 2008). Malmendier and Tate (2008) find evidence that overconfident CEOs are 
more likely to conduct acquisitions, especially if they are able to use internal financing 
and the acquisition is diversifying. Moreover, they show that the market reaction for 
acquisitions conducted by overconfident CEOs are more negative than for acquisitions 
conducted by non-overconfident CEOs (Malmendier and Tate 2008). 
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3.3. Gender diversity and risk-taking 
The previous literature has widely documented that women differ from men in their risk-
taking behavior not only in general, but also in economic and financial context. For 
example, Olsen and Cox (2001), Powell and Ansic (1997), Fehr-Duda, de Gennaro and 
Schubert (2006), and Borghans, Golsteyn, Heckman and Meijers (2009) conclude that 
women are more cautious and risk averse than men in their financial decisions. 
Furthermore, the prior literature has demonstrated an association between firm risk level 
and top management’s gender diversity. For example, Weber and Zulehner (2010), Elsaid 
and Ursel (2011), Cole (2013), Palvia, Vähämaa and Vähämaa (2015) and Faccio, 
Marchica and Mura (2016) report evidence of negative relationship between firm risk 
level and female leaders, while Ahern and Dittmar (2012), Berger, Kick and Schaeck 
(2014), Sila, Gonzalez and Hagendorff (2016) as well as Peltomäki, Swidler and 
Vähämaa (2016) obtain opposing results. 
In more specific, Elsaid and Ursel (2011) study the relationship between newly appointed 
CEO’s gender and firm’s risk-taking behaviour in 679 North American firms during the 
period of 1992-2005. By applying instrumental variable approach, Elsaid and Ursel 
(2011) find that firm’s risk level decreases when CEO is changed from male to female 
CEO. Cole (2013), in turn, document evidence that small private U.S. firms that are 
owned by women are, on average, less leveraged than their counterpart companies owned 
by men. Moreover, Weber and Zulehner (2010) document that a female among the first 
employees increases the likelihood of the company to survive. 
In a more recent study, Palvia, Vähämaa and Vähämaa (2015) examine the influence of 
CEO and Chairperson’s gender to the risk level of U.S. commercial banks in years 2007-
2010. They measure banks’ risk level with capital ratios and default risk, and use panel 
and logistic regressions as their main empirical methodologies. In order to mitigate 
possible endogeneity and reverse causality issues, Palvia, Vähämaa and Vähämaa (2015) 
apply also instrumental variable approach. Palvia, Vähämaa and Vähämaa (2015) find 
evidence that banks with female CEOs or female board Chairs are associated with more 
conservative level of capital ratios, and that gender does not have impact on the likelihood 
of a bank to default except for smaller banks. Palvia, Vähämaa and Vähämaa (2015) 
suggest that female leaders’ conservatism is especially vital for smaller banks as they are 
less able to absorb external shocks. 
Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016) contribute to the previous literature by examining the 
relationship between CEO’s gender, corporate risk-taking and capital allocation 
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efficiency. They study a large sample of both private and public European firms during 
the period of 1999-2009. In order to study the difference between female and male CEOs’ 
corporate risk-taking, Faccio et al. (2016) consider three measures: leverage, earnings 
volatility and the likelihood of survival. They find that firms with a female CEO are less 
leveraged, have smaller volatility in their earnings and are more likely to survive than 
firms with a male CEO. Faccio et al. (2016) conclude that female executives are more 
risk averse and therefore not as efficient to allocate capital as male executives. 
In contrast to Faccio et al. (2016), Ahern and Dittmar (2012) report opposing results. 
They find a positive association between female directors and Norwegian companies’ 
risk-taking behaviour (Ahern and Dittmar 2012). Ahern and Dittmar (2012) conclude that 
the Norwegian gender quota, introduced in 2003, led Norwegian companies to hire 
younger and more unexperienced directors in their boards, which in turn led companies 
to increase their leverage and acquisitions activity resulting to decreased level of 
operational performance. 
Peltomäki, Swidler and Vähämaa (2016) complement the findings of Ahern and Dittmar 
(2012) by studying top managements’ age and genders’ impact on firm risk-taking 
behaviour in S&P 1500 firms during the period of 2004-2014. They measure firm’s total 
risk with the volatility of daily stock return, systematic risk with market model estimated 
beta and idiosyncratic risk with the volatility of market model regression residuals. 
Peltomäki, Swidler and Vähämaa (2016) use fixed-effects panel regression as their main 
empirical methodology as well as instrumental variable, propensity score matching and 
difference-in-difference approaches in order to mitigate possible endogeneity issues.  
Peltomäki, Swidler and Vähämaa (2016) show that female CEOs and CFOs are positively 
associated with firm’s risk level after firm-specific characteristics and compensation 
incentives are controlled. However, they further document that older CEOs and CFOs are 
associated with lower risk level than their younger counterparts, and that female CEOs 
and CFOs are, on average, younger than males. Therefore, Peltomäki, Swidler and 
Vähämaa (2016) suggest that positive association between female leaders and firm risk 
may be confounded by the age-effect. 
In contrast to Palvia et al. (2015), Berger, Kick and Schaeck (2014) show that female 
directors are positively associated with financial firms’ risk level. Berger et al. (2014), 
however, focus on female directors’ effect on financial firms’ portfolio risk, rather than 
capital ratios or default risk. Berger et al. (2014), study the large sample of German banks 
during the period of 1994-2010 by employing difference-in-differences approach. They 
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conclude that bank’s portfolio risk tends to increase when the number of female directors 
increase (Berger et al. 2014).  
Lastly, Sila, Gonzalez and Hagendorff (2016) examine whether board of directors’ gender 
diversity has an impact on the non-financial firm’s risk level by considering U.S. 
companies in years 1996-2010. They use dynamic panel system GMM estimator to 
mitigate endogeneity issues and the challenge to find a strong instrumental variable (Sila 
et al. 2016). Sila et al. (2016) find that female representation in board have neither positive 
nor negative association with firm’s risk level when taking possible endogeneity issues 
into consideration. Moreover, they document that unobservable firm-level factors cause 
gender-risk relationship to be negative, yet spurious, as they have significant influence 
on both firm’s risk level and board of directors’ gender diversity (Sila et al. 2016). 
Therefore, Sila et al. (2016) conclude that female directors of non-financial firms are 
willing to bear as much risk as their male counterparts. 
3.4. Conclusions from the prior empirical evidence 
The prior empirical evidence regarding gender diversity and firm performance suggests 
that firms with more diversified management teams are associated positively with firm 
profitability, valuation level and long-term share price performance, as well as negatively 
with corporate risk-taking. For example, Krishnan and Parson (2008), Welbourne (1999) 
and Dwyer et al. (2003) find that more diversified management teams have statistically 
significant and positive relation with firm profitability, Tobin’s Q and share price return, 
while Weber and Zulehner (2010) document a negative relationship between management 
team’s gender diversity and the company’s likelihood of survival.  
Furthermore, the previous literature suggests that individual executives are also 
associated with higher firm profitability and valuation as well as with lower risk level. 
For example, Khan and Vieito (2013) find that female CEOs are associated with higher 
firm profitability, and Faccio et al. (2016) conclude that firms with a female CEO have 
lower risk level than firms with a male CEO. In contrast, the previous literature suggests 
that board of director’s gender diversity is associated negatively with firm performance, 
and positively with corporate risk-taking (for example Adams and Ferreira 2009; Ahern 
and Dittmar 2012; Berger et al. 2014). Peltomäki et al. (2016) find also opposing results 
regarding the individual executives and corporate risk-taking. 
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As the literature regarding individual executive’s gender and firm performance is limited, 
it is important to study whether the prior empirical evidence regarding top management 
and board of directors is applicable also for individual executives. For this reason, I 
examine whether the association between higher firm valuation, long-term share price 
performance and female executives is in line with the prior evidence after controlling for 
possible endogeneity bias. Furthermore, the prior literature tends to study only one or few 
firm performance measures simultaneously. In order to obtain a comprehensive view on 
CEO gender’s impact on firm performance, I study firm performance from four different 
perspectives. 
Finally, the prior literature measures firm profitability with net income based profitability 
measures, such as ROA or ROI. These measures however indicate only the firm’s overall 
profitability but not the firm’s operational profitability. In order to examine why top 
management’s gender diversity is associated positively with firm profitability, it is 
important to study whether gender is associated with firm profitability also on operational 
level. I conjecture that if gender is positively associated with firm’s operational 
profitability, the positive relation with firm’s overall profitability is driven by the firm’s 
more efficient operations rather than inoperative income statement items such as 
depreciations and financing costs. To address this issue, I study both overall and 
operational firm profitability measures, ROA and EBITD on total assets.  
34 
 
 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
This chapter presents the research hypotheses of the empirical study. Furthermore, it 
provides an overview of the applied sample data and a summary of the data refining 
process. In order to define appropriate empirical methodologies for the study, the chapter 
first considers possible endogeneity issues related to the data and then discusses the 
advantages and limitations of the applied empirical methodologies. Finally, applied 
methodologies are presented in more detail. 
4.1. Research hypotheses 
The purpose of this thesis is to study the relationship between CEO gender and firm 
performance in terms of firm profitability, mergers and acquisitions, corporate risk-taking 
and valuation. To study the difference between female and male CEOs on four different 
fields of firm performance, I outline seven hypotheses and group them based on the field 
of firm performance they represent.  
Profitability  
Khan and Vieito (2013) report that female CEOs are positively associated with 
profitability. Based on the findings of Khan and Vieito (2013), I form the first and second 
research hypotheses as follows: 
H1: Firms with a female CEO have higher operational profitability (EBITD on total 
assets) than firms with a male CEO on average 
H2: Firms with a female CEO have higher overall profitability (ROA) than firms with a 
male CEO on average 
Mergers and acquisitions  
Levi, Li and Zhang (2014) document that female directors are more risk averse, and 
therefore they consider acquisitions more carefully: they are not as overconfident of 
acquisition’s synergies as male directors. Thus, female directors are not willing to pay as 
much acquisition premium and they do not bid as eagerly as male directors. They 
conclude that female directors affect positively on the shareholder value through avoiding 
bad acquisitions. (Levi, Li and Zhang 2014.) 
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Furthermore, Huang and Kisgen (2013) show that female executives tend to conduct less 
acquisitions, and that the acquisitions they conduct are less value-destroying in short-term 
in comparison to male executives. Huang and Kisgen (2013) suggest that female 
executives’ lower corporate finance activity results from females’ weaker 
overconfidence. Based on these findings, I form the third and fourth research hypotheses 
as follows: 
H3: Female CEOs conduct less acquisitions than male CEOs on average 
H4: Acquisitions conducted by female CEOs offer more long-term value for shareholders 
than acquisitions conducted by male CEOs on average 
Risk-taking 
Faccio, Marchica and Mura (2016) document that firms with a female CEO tend to be 
less risky than firms with a male CEO. They show that female CEOs’ firms are less 
leveraged, their earnings are less volatile and they are more likely to survive than firms 
with male CEOs (Faccio et al. 2016). Based on these findings, I form the fifth and sixth 
research hypotheses as follows: 
H5: Firms with a female CEO are less leveraged than firms with a male CEO on average 
H6: Firms with a female CEO have less volatile earnings than firms with a male CEO on 
average 
Valuation and long-term stock performance 
If female CEOs are associated with better firm performance, and their companies are less 
risky, I expect to find that firms managed by a female CEO have also higher valuation 
level and that they have higher stock returns than firms managed by a male CEO. 
Therefore, I form the seventh and eighth research hypotheses as follows: 
H7: Firms with a female CEO have higher long-term stock return than firms with a male 
CEO on average 
H8: Firms with a female CEO have higher Tobin’s Q than firms with a male CEO on 
average 
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4.2. Descriptive statistics 
I study S&P 1500 firms during the period of January 2005- December 2015 to empirically 
examine the difference between female and male CEOs. The study focuses on non-
financial firms, and hence I exclude firms with Standard Industrial Classification code 
between 6000 and 6999. I include in the sample all firms that have been on one of the 
three S&P1500 indices (S&P600, S&P500 or S&P400) during the period to increase the 
sample size and the number of female CEOs under study. The total sample consists of 
1,721 firms with 15,163 firm-year observations. 545, or approximately 3.6% of the firm-
year observations are observations with a female CEO.  
The sample used with the difference-in-differences approach consists of firms with 
executive transition. I focus on firms with male-to-female executive transition because 
the number of firms with female-to-male executive transition is too small for meaningful 
analysis. I use firms with male-to-male executive transition as the control group for the 
male-to-female transition firms. I require the transiting CEOs to be in office at least two 
years to ensure that the CEO has enough time to impact the corporate policy and firm 
performance. The difference-in-differences sample consists of 9,803 firm-year 
observations with 346 female CEO observations, corresponding approximately 3.5% of 
the sample. 
Executives’ personal information, such as gender, age and total compensation is collected 
from Compustat Execucomp database. I require the CEO to be in office most of the year 
in order to match the firm’s annual financial data with the CEO that has had most impact 
on it. Moreover, I exclude 69 firm-year observations from the sample in order to ensure 
that the CEO is not paid only a nominal compensation. The largest excluded nominal 
compensation is little less than $10,000 including annual fixed salary, bonuses, option 
awards, stock awards and other annual compensation. I collect daily stock return data 
from Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. The returns are adjusted 
for dividends representing the total return of the security.  
Annual financial data and information regarding mergers and acquisitions are collected 
from Thomson Reuters database. An acquisition is included into the sample, if the 
acquirer is from U.S. and the transaction is fully completed. I consider only acquisitions 
in which majority of the ownership is acquired. Both international and domestic 
acquisitions are included in the sample. 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of the study sample. The study variables are 
divided into four groups based on the firm performance field their present, as well as two 
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control variable groups. The number of variables’ observations ranges from 6,109 to 
15,163. All other variables have at least 12,242 observations except the post-acquisition 
abnormal return variable which has only 6,109 observations. The number of post-
acquisition return observations are limited for two reasons: first, the variable is calculated 
only for firms that have made acquisitions, and second, the observations with less than 
two years of post-acquisition share price quotes are excluded due to the interest towards 
long-term share price performance.  
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the study sample. 
  
Table 2 presents the mean differences between male and female CEOs regarding the study 
variables. The table indicates that firms with a female CEO are significantly larger than 
firms with a male CEO in terms of total assets and sales. Firms with a female CEO are 
also less leveraged in terms of debt ratio, however, when measuring firm leverage with 
gearing ratio, firms with a female CEO are found to be as leveraged as firms with a male 
CEO. Furthermore, female-led firms’ average valuation level is on discount relatively to 
firms led by males, and they do significantly less acquisitions per year. Female-led firms 
are as profitable as firms with a male leader. Table 2 implies also that female CEOs are 
significantly younger than male CEOs and that their total compensation is higher on 
average.  
 Mean  Median  Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness  Kurtosis Observations
Executive specific characteristics
CEO Age 55.85 56.00 96.00 27.00 7.17 0.34 4.09 15,002
Ln Compensation 6.76 6.75 11.26 2.96 0.61 0.62 7.51 14,997
CEO gender 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.19 4.99 25.86 15,163
Firm specific characteristics
Ln Assets 14.51 14.40 20.50 7.79 1.63 0.29 2.88 15,068
Ln Mcap 14.57 14.44 20.29 3.40 1.65 0.16 3.53 14,939
Ln Sales 14.39 14.33 20.00 0.00 1.59 0.11 3.75 15,077
Profitability
ROA 0.06 0.06 1.58 -1.27 0.11 -1.29 23.89 14,968
EBITD on TA 0.13 0.13 3.44 -2.96 0.14 -2.69 77.94 14,719
Acquistions
No. of  acquisitions 0.99 0.00 29.00 0.00 1.68 4.00 31.60 15,163
M&A abnormal return -0.05 -0.06 6.20 -5.09 0.67 0.79 10.98 6,109
Risk
ROA volatility 2.23 0.33 607.19 0.00 16.05 24.10 688.20 14,671
Net income volatility 3.56 0.41 3098.82 0.00 45.27 51.04 3176.68 15,008
Gearing 0.37 0.33 171.50 -86.36 1.82 58.36 6713.01 12,361
Debt Ratio 0.26 0.23 4.05 0.00 0.23 5.12 68.92 15,040
Valuation
Tobin's Q 1.68 1.29 15.90 -0.08 1.33 3.06 17.91 14,844
Abnormal return 0.01 -0.02 30.96 -4.60 0.80 12.24 355.10 12,242
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Table 2. Test of mean differences.  
 
4.3. Dependent variables 
In order to measure firm’s profitability, I use return on assets (ROA) and EBITD on total 
assets as dependent variables. ROA is defined as the net income divided by total assets. 
EBITD on total assets is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciations 
divided by total assets. ROA measures firm profitability by taking into account most of 
the income statement items, while EBITD on total assets focus on the operational items 
measuring only the operational efficiency of the firm. I include both measures to study 
whether the difference between female and male CEOs’ firm profitability results from 
more efficient use of operational resources such as labor and raw materials, or from 
resources related to financing costs and earnings management.  
I study female executives’ association with firm’s risk level by using gearing ratio, debt 
ratio, ROA volatility and net income volatility as the independent variables. Gearing ratio 
is defined as long-term debt to total capital employed, and debt ratio as total debt to total 
assets. ROA and net income volatility are defined as the standard deviation of logarithmic 
changes of ROA and net income, respectively.  
Male CEO Female CEO
 Mean  Mean Mean 
difference
Executive specific characteristics
CEO Age 55.92 54.10 -1.82 -8.11 ***
Ln Compensation 6.75 6.82 0.06 2.50 **
Firm specific characteristics 0.00
Ln Assets 14.50 14.72 0.22 4.36 ***
Ln Mcap 14.56 14.61 0.05 0.88
Ln Sales 14.38 14.65 0.27 5.29 ***
Acquistions
No. of  acquisitions 0.99 0.85 -0.14 -2.72 ***
M&A abnromal return -0.05 -0.06 -0.01 -0.46
Profitability
ROA 0.06 0.06 0.00 -0.53
EBITD on TA 0.13 0.13 0.00 -0.51
Risk
ROA volatility 2.27 1.25 -1.01 -1.45
Net Income Volatility 3.58 2.85 -0.74 -0.43
Gearing 0.37 0.47 0.10 1.20
Debt Ratio 0.26 0.19 -0.07 -14.95 ***
Valuation
Tobin's Q 1.69 1.52 -0.17 -3.95 ***
Abnormal return 0.01 -0.03 -0.04 -1.58
Test of Difference
t-statistic
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I measure firm’s acquisition activity with the number of executed acquisitions during a 
year, and the long-term post-acquisition stock price performance with the post-acquisition 
abnormal return of 24 months. I calculate abnormal returns by applying Buy and Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR) model. I choose to use BHAR methodology as it resembles 
investor’s actual investment experience better than approaches in which portfolios are 
rebalanced frequently. 
The abnormal return is defined as: 
(1) 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖(𝑡, 𝑇) =  ∏ (1 +  𝑅𝑖,𝑡)𝑡=1𝑡𝑜 𝑇 − ∏ (1 +  𝑅𝐵,𝑡)𝑡=1 𝑡𝑜 𝑇  
Where Ri,t is the total return of event firm i at time t and RB is the total return of a non-
event firm portfolio matched with event firm i. Event firm i is defined as a firm that has 
executed an acquisitions within the year t. I match non-event firms with event firms based 
on their annual market capitalization reflecting the size of the company, book-to-market 
ratio and the past share price performance one year before time t. I choose these three 
characteristics to define securities’ abnormal returns based on Fama and French’s (1996) 
as well as Carhart’s (1997) empirical evidence of asset pricing. 
I first divide all non-event firms into four portfolios based on the quartiles they represent. 
Quartiles are defined for all three characteristics for every year. After obtaining 120 (3 x 
4 x 10) quartile portfolios, I form index portfolios from quartile portfolios. An index 
portfolio represents a group of firms that are in the same market capitalization, book-to-
market and past performance quartiles. Next, I match index portfolios with the 
corresponding event firms, and calculate the difference between the index portfolio’s 
return (non-event firm portfolio) and the event firm’s return. This way I am able to 
compare event firms with their peer firms matched based on market capitalization, book-
to-market ratio and past performance. As such data refining requires a lot computing 
power, I use statistical software R studio to program the calculations. 
In order to measure firm valuation and stock performance, I use Tobin’s Q as well as 
long-term abnormal return as dependent variables. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the 
market value of capital divided by the book value of assets. The market value of capital 
is a sum of market value of equity minus deferred taxes, plus book value of debt. 
Abnormal stock price return is calculated by applying Buy and Hold Abnormal Return 
(BHAR) model, and it is defined as the difference between the total return of firm i and 
the total return of a peer firm portfolio matched with firm i. I match firms with their peer 
firm portfolios based on the companies’ annual market capitalization, book-to-market 
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ratio and one year past share price performance. Abnormal return is calculated from the 
two-year period.  
4.4. Endogeneity 
As pointed out by Huang and Kisgen (2013), an executive’s selection to a firm is unlikely 
to be random – the selection is most likely affected by the executive’s own characteristics 
and desires. Such deliberate selection may cause endogeneity issues in the data, which in 
turn may affect the findings of the study (Huang and Kisgen 2013).  
Huang and Kisgen (2013) argue that the endogeneity issues may rise as a result of biased 
selection patterns such as board of directors’ discrimination, overcrowding phenomena 
(Bergmann 1974) and executives’ self-selection. Furthermore, Kaplan et al. (2012) 
suggest that omitted variable and dynamic reverse causality may lie behind the issue. 
Kaplan et al. (2012) argue that omitted variable may cause endogeneity issue if an omitted 
uncontrolled firm characteristic has simultaneously impact on both executive’s selection 
process and firm performance measure. Dynamic reverse causality, in turn, can cause 
similar issues if executive selection process is influenced by the past firm performance. 
As the data used in this thesis is likely to suffer similar issues, I apply difference-in-
differences approach to mitigate possible endogeneity bias. I consider to use also 
instrumental variable approach to mitigate endogeneity bias, however, I am unable to find 
a strong instrument for female CEOs. For example, the state-level gender equality applied 
by Huang and Kisgen (2013) is too weak for my sample. In addition to the difference-in-
differences methodology, I use traditional panel data regression as a complimentary 
methodology to increase the robustness of the results. The difference-in-differences 
approach mitigates endogeneity issues as it compares differences between two different 
event types during a fixed time period. In this study, I compare a firm’s performance 
measure before and after an executives’ transition  ̶  the difference between a male-to-
female executive transition and a male-to-male executive transition. Male-to-male 
executive transitions form the control group of the study. 
I choose to use the difference-in-differences approach because it has three advantages. 
Firstly, the approach requires executives to hold their position for a significant period of 
time, in this case, two years. A significant time period confirms that the executives have 
time to implement their decisions and to make an impact on the corporate policy. 
Secondly, the approach excludes unique factors related to time period that may affect the 
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executive transition. For example, a first-year executive may not make as good decisions 
as an experienced executive, however, the inferior decisions are more likely to result from 
the lack of experience rather than gender. By excluding such factors, inaccurate 
conclusions can be avoided. Lastly, this approach reduces noise. (Huang and Kisgen 
2013.)  
On the other hand, the long time period requirement can be also seen as a limitation. That 
is, the tighter requirements do not only improve the quality of the observations but also 
exclude certain types of observations from the sample. This in turn may compromise the 
credibility of the study as the exclusion of an observation type may lead to a situation 
where potentially significant information is ignored. For example, the empirical study of 
this thesis could be compromised if all female-to-male transition observations would be 
excluded from the sample and this observation type would have significant explanatory 
power over firm performance. For this reason, I use panel data regressions as a 
complimentary methodology to show that all excluded observations are insignificant and 
do not have explanatory power over firm performance. In addition, I use panel data 
regressions to verify the robustness of the difference-in-difference approach.  
4.5. Empirical models 
I use two empirical methodologies in this study: difference-in-differences approach and 
panel data regressions. I include time and firm fixed effects in both difference-in-
differences and panel data regressions to control time and firm specific factors. 
Furthermore, I include industry fixed effects in panel data regressions. I choose to use 
fixed effects model instead of random effect because the data represents whole population 
(stock indices) rather than a randomly selected sample (Brooks 2014: 537). 
Difference-in-differences model used in this study is defined as: 
(2) 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 +  𝛽2𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 ×𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 +
𝑣𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡 +  𝛾𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑒  
Where 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the measure of either profitability, risk level, 
acquisition activity, abnormal return or valuation level of a firm i at time t; 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is 
male-to-female transition dummy that obtain value 1 when CEO transition is from male 
to female, and 0 when transition is from male to male; 𝐴𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑖,𝑡 is a dummy variable for 
post-transition period that obtain value 1 when CEO transition is after time t and 0 
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otherwise; 𝑣𝑖 are firm fixed effects; 𝜏𝑡 are time fixed effects and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are control 
variables for firm size, profitability, capital structure, valuation, CEO age and CEO 
compensation for a CEO that works in firm i during the year t.  
In the footsteps of Huang and Kisgen (2013), the first 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 dummy variable of 
traditional difference-in-differences model is not included in the equation. According to 
Huang and Kisgen (2013) the first 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 dummy variable is unnecessary, since the 
equation also includes firm fixed effects. By including both elements to the regression, 
the regression becomes dummy variable trapped.  
I use panel data regression to study whether CEO gender has explanatory power over firm 
performance among the full study sample. The panel data regression model used in the 
study is defined as: 
(3) 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 +  𝛾𝑖𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡 +
𝑣/𝜌𝑖 + 𝑒 
Where, 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖,𝑡 is the measure of either profitability, risk level, 
acquisition activity, abnormal return or valuation level of a firm i at time t; 𝐹𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑖 is a 
dummy variable which obtain value 1 if CEO is female and 0 otherwise; 𝜏𝑡 are time fixed 
effects; 𝑣/𝜌𝑖 are either firm fixed effects or industry fixed effects; and 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖,𝑡 are 
control variables for firm size, profitability, capital structure, valuation, CEO age and 
CEO compensation for a CEO that works in firm i during the year t. A firm’s industry is 
defined based on its first SIC-code number. 
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
In this chapter, I present the empirical results of the study. The chapter is divided into 
four subsections based on the four dimensions of the study: profitability, mergers and 
acquisitions, corporate risk-taking and valuation. In each section, I present first the 
empirical results of difference-differences approach, and second the empirical results of 
panel data regressions. 
5.1. Female CEOs and profitability 
Table 3 presents the difference-in-differences regression analysis of firm profitability and 
CEO gender. Models (1) and (2) present the difference-in-differences regressions with 
time and firm fixed effects without control variables. Models (3) and (4) present the 
corresponding regressions with additional firm specific controls for firm size, valuation, 
and leverage, as well as executive specific controls for CEO age and CEO total 
compensation. After*Female coefficient indicates the relationship between the dependent 
variable and a female CEO that has taken a male CEO’s place in a firm at least two years 
ago. After coefficient implies the association between the dependent variable and an 
executive transition in general. 
Table 3 suggests that CEO gender does not have impact on firm’s operational profitability 
measured as EBITD on total assets. All After*Female coefficients for EBITD on total 
assets are positive, yet statistically insignificant. Instead, firm size and valuation, as well 
as CEO age and total compensation have relation with firm operational profitability even 
after adjusting for time fixed effects. Firm size and valuation are positively associated 
with firm’s operational profitability at 1% significance level, while CEO age and 
compensation are positively associated with firm’s operational profitability at 5% 
significance level. Furthermore, Table 3 implies that a new CEO in general has negative 
impact on firm’s operational profitability. However, the result is not robust for time fixed 
effects. 
Even though CEO’s gender is not significant for operational profitability, I record that it 
is significant for firm’s overall profitability measured as return on assets, ROA. Table 3 
implies that after a male-to-female executive transition, the firm’s overall profitability 
increases by 1.4-1.5 percentage points on average. The finding is significant at 5% 
significance level and robust for time fixed effects. Interestingly, the effect is opposite for 
executive transitions in general – the firm’s profitability decreases by 0.5-2.4 percentage 
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points on average after a male-to-female or a male-to-male executive transition. The 
finding is significant at 1% level when firm fixed effects are controlled (Model 3), 
however, insignificant after adjusting for time fixed effects as well. The results suggest 
that the new CEO in general has negative impact on ROA, however, when the CEO is 
woman, the impact is positive. Table 3 indicates also that CEO’s total compensation has 
significant impact on firm’s overall profitability level, while CEO’s age has not after time 
fixed effects have been included into the equation. CEO’s total compensation is positively 
associated with firm’s profitability at 1% significance level.  
 
Table 3. Difference-in-differences regressions of firm profitability. 
Table 3 presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions of EBITD on total assets and 
ROA. EBITD on total assets is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciations divided 
by total assets. ROA is defined as the net income before extraordinary items and discounted 
operations divided by total assets. Numbers in parentheses indicate White cross-section t-
statistics. Statistically significant differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels are 
indicated. 
 
The dependent variables, EBITD on total assets and ROA, deviate from each other only 
by three income statement items: interest, taxes and depreciations. Therefore, it is 
interesting to notice that the dependent variables’ results are significantly different. The 
results indicate that female CEOs are not associated with better operational profitability 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
C 0.137 *** 0.130 *** -0.650 *** -0.859 *** 0.066 *** 0.062 *** -0.653 *** -0.789 ***
(15.553) (49.954) -(6.399) -(6.677) (7.967) (34.864) -(6.880) -(7.152)
After -0.016 * -0.005 -0.027 *** 0.002 -0.013 * -0.005 * -0.024 *** -0.003
-(1.919) -(1.119) -(4.224) (0.395) -(1.821) -(1.787) -(5.571) -(1.150)
After*Female 0.009 0.010 0.011 0.011 0.009 0.009 0.015 ** 0.014 **
(0.870) (0.872) (1.252) (1.232) (1.083) (1.093) (2.516) (2.509)
Ln Mcap 0.048 *** 0.058 *** 0.046 *** 0.052 ***
(7.801) (6.478) (7.584) (6.971)
Gearing 0.000 * 0.000 0.000 0.000
-(1.668) -(1.640) -(0.918) -(0.899)
Tobin's Q 0.018 *** 0.018 *** 0.013 *** 0.013 ***
(3.584) (3.510) (2.723) (2.648)
Age 0.000 * 0.000 ** 0.000 ** 0.000
-(1.922) (2.274) -(2.076) (0.079)
Ln Compensation 0.011 ** 0.012 ** 0.009 ** 0.010 ***
(2.020) (2.290) (2.525) (3.213)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 8,588 8,588 8,353 8,353 8,711 8,711 8,475 8,475
R-squared 0.49 0.50 0.55 0.57 0.44 0.46 0.51 0.53
F-statistic 7.38 7.68 9.05 9.48 6.03 6.43 7.88 8.28
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EBITD on TA ROA
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(EBITD on total assets), but simultaneously with better overall profitability (ROA). This 
finding suggests that female CEOs are as efficient as male CEOs to use their firm 
resources, such as labor force and raw materials, however there are some material 
differences between female and male CEOs when considering firm’s financial costs, 
taxation and depreciation policies. It might be that firms with a female CEO have smaller 
capital costs than firms with a male CEO, or they have different depreciation policies. 
Furthermore, as it is fair to assume that the taxation is equal for all companies, there might 
be some gender specific differences in the utilization of tax advantages.  
The mean difference between female and male CEO firms’ leverage supports the 
conjecture that female CEOs’ better overall profitability is driven by their smaller 
financing costs. Table 2 suggests that firms with a female CEO are less leveraged in terms 
of debt ratio, and therefore they most likely have smaller financing costs than firms with 
a male CEO. However, as presented in the following sections I record ambiguous 
evidence of CEO gender’s impact on the firm’s leverage by studying the relationship with 
the difference-in-differences approach and panel data regressions. Alternatively, one 
possible explanation for female-led firms’ lower financing costs might be their lower cost 
of debt, which in turn could encourage the firms to rely more on debt financing, yet still 
result to smaller financing costs. Female CEOs’ association with lower earnings volatility 
(as presented in section 5.3.) supports this conjecture, however, no comprehensive 
conclusions can be made without a further more specific research on genders’ differences 
in financing costs. 
Table 4 presents the panel data regressions of firm profitability measures, EBITD on total 
assets and ROA. Model (1) includes time fixed effects, Model (2) time and firm fixed 
effects, as well as Model (3) time and industry fixed effects. The table suggests that 
CEO’s gender is not significant for neither firm’s operational nor overall profitability. 
That is, firms with a female CEO are as profitable as firms with a male CEO in terms of 
EBITD on total assets and ROA. Instead, firm size, valuation level and CEO 
compensation are positively and significantly associated with firm’s profitability at 5% 
and 1% levels. Furthermore, CEO’s age is positively and significantly associated with 
both profitability measures at 5% and 1% levels when firm fixed effects are not 
controlled. This implies that the large firms with high valuation as well as old and well 
compensated CEOs are more profitable, on average. 
The insignificant Female CEO coefficients of Table 4 support the results presented in 
Table 3. This is because, the data used in panel data regressions include also firms with 
female-to-female and female-to-male executive transitions. Insignificant coefficients 
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imply that the difference-in-differences approach does not ignore any significant 
information by leaving the female-to-female and female-to-male transition firms out of 
the sample.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of panel data regressions of EBITD on total assets and ROA. EBITD 
on total assets is defined as earnings before interest, taxes and depreciations divided by total 
assets. ROA is defined as the net income before extraordinary items and discounted operations 
divided by total assets. Numbers in parentheses indicate White cross-section t-statistics. 
Statistically significant differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels are indicated. 
 
Based on the results of Table 3 and Table 4, I reject the first research hypothesis H1 and 
accept the second research hypothesis H2 – firms with a female CEO do not have higher 
operational profitability (EBITD on total assets) than firms with a male CEO, however 
they have significantly higher overall profitability (ROA) on average. The results 
regarding firm’s overall profitability is in line with the previous literature, for example 
with Khan and Vieito (2013). To the best of my knowledge, there are no previous 
Table 4. Profitability panel data regressions. 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
C -0.178 *** -0.746 *** -0.182 *** -0.216 *** -0.694 *** -0.219 ***
-(10.494) -(6.494) -(10.361) -(14.628) -(7.251) -(15.046)
Female CEO 0.000 0.006 -0.002 0.004 0.005 0.002
(0.006) (0.933) -(0.364) (1.189) (0.912) (0.698)
Ln Mcap 0.015 *** 0.051 *** 0.015 *** 0.014 *** 0.044 *** 0.014 ***
(5.516) (5.676) (5.446) (6.952) (6.424) (6.842)
Tobin's Q 0.037 *** 0.022 *** 0.037 *** 0.028 *** 0.017 *** 0.028 ***
(13.539) (5.146) (13.462) (14.067) (4.220) (13.937)
Gearing 0.000 -0.001 * 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
-(0.250) -(1.899) -(0.338) -(0.747) -(1.144) -(0.762)
Age 0.000 ** 0.000 0.001 ** 0.000 *** 0.000 0.000 ***
(2.467) (0.389) (2.549) (4.966) (0.176) (4.660)
Ln Compensation 0.000 0.011 ** 0.000 0.001 0.011 *** 0.001
-(0.040) (2.133) (0.024) (0.240) (3.549) (0.264)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 11,739 11,739 11,739 11,901 11,901 11,901
R-squared 0.17 0.53 0.18 0.20 0.50 0.21
F-statistic 154.62 7.23 128.94 188.01 6.45 153.24
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
EBITD on TA ROA
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literature regarding the relationship between CEO gender and firm’s operational 
profitability measured as EBITD on total assets. 
5.2. Female CEOs and mergers and acquisitions 
Table 5 presents the results of difference-in-differences regression analysis of acquisition 
activity and post-acquisition abnormal return. In contrast to previous literature such as 
Levi, Li and Zhang (2014), and Huang and Kisgen (2013), I record evidence that CEO 
gender is insignificant for firm’s acquisition activity. All After*Female coefficients in 
acquisition activity column are insignificant suggesting that CEO’s gender does not have 
impact on the number of acquisitions the firm executes during a year. Instead, I record 
that CEO’s age and compensation matter – CEO’s age is negatively and CEO’s 
compensation positively associated with the number of acquisitions the firm executes. 
The result suggests that old CEOs are less eager to acquire firms than young CEOs, and 
that well compensated CEOs are more eager to acquire firms than CEOs with low 
compensation. Firm specific factors, such as profitability, size and valuation, are also 
significant for a firm’s acquisition activity at 1% level.  
Table 5 implies also that firms with a female CEO destroy shareholder value 28.9 
percentage points more than firms with a male CEO during the two-year period after an 
acquisition. This finding is significant at 1% level, however, not robust for time fixed 
effects suggesting that time specific factors have significant explanatory power over the 
abnormal return. After controlling for time fixed effects, the After*Female coefficient is 
negative (-21.5 percentage points) but insignificant. Furthermore, the regression’s R-
squared value increases from 39% to 81% after fixed time effects are included, implying 
that time fixed effects capture significant amount of additional information. Firm size is 
also negatively associated with the two-year abnormal return at 5% and 1% significance 
levels, with and without time fixed effects, respectively.  
Table 6 presents the results of panel data regressions of acquisition activity and post-
acquisition abnormal return. Model (1) include time fixed effects, Model (2) time and 
firm fixed effects, as well as Model (3) time and industry fixed effects. Panel data 
regressions indicate that CEO’s gender is associated negatively with firm’s acquisitions 
activity at 5% significance level when time and industry fixed effects are controlled. The 
table indicates that firms with a female CEO execute annually 0.2 fewer acquisitions than 
firms with a male CEO. The evidence, however, is weak as the Female CEO coefficient 
is significant only in Model (3) in which the firm specific factors are not controlled. 
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Furthermore, I document that CEO’s gender does not have impact on firm’s post-
acquisition abnormal return. The findings are in line with the difference-in-differences 
approach as well as the tests of mean differences.  
Table 5 presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions of acquisition activity and 
abnormal return. Acquisition activity is measured as the number of completed mergers and 
acquisitions during a calendar year. Abnormal return is calculated by applying Buy and Hold 
Abnormal Return (BHAR) model, and it is defined as the difference between the total return of 
event firm i and the total return of a non-event firm portfolio matched with event firm i. I match 
non-event firms with event firms based on the companies’ annual market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio and one year past share price performance. Abnormal return is calculated from the 
two-year period after the acquisition. Numbers in parentheses indicate White cross-section t-
statistics. Statistically significant differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels are 
indicated. 
 
In contrast, firm’s profitability, size, valuation level and CEO’s compensation are 
significant for firm’s acquisition activity on at least 5% level after adjusting for firm fixed 
effects. Table 6 implies that profitable, large firms with relatively high valuation and well 
compensated CEOs are more likely to do acquisitions than unprofitable, small firms with 
Table 5. Difference-in-differences regressions of acquisition activity and post-
acquisitions abnormal return. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
C 0.997 *** 0.887 *** -1.150 -2.860 *** -0.042 ** -0.074 5.746 *** 6.308 **
(14.558) (36.913) -(1.124) -(5.217) -(1.977) -(1.503) (5.834) (2.506)
After -0.059 0.118 *** -0.151 *** 0.095 ** -0.005 0.058 0.123 ** 0.042
-(1.172) (3.143) -(3.042) (2.099) -(0.129) (0.576) (2.444) (0.313)
After*Female 0.060 0.068 0.093 0.102 -0.241 ** -0.227 -0.289 *** -0.215
(1.013) (1.047) (1.171) (1.174) -(2.417) -(0.997) -(2.747) -(0.840)
ROA 0.007 *** 0.004 *** -0.002 -0.009 *
(3.442) (2.832) -(0.690) -(1.710)
Ln Mcap 0.148 *** 0.225 ***
(2.577) (8.083)
Ln Sales -0.435 *** -0.407 **
-(6.637) -(2.522)
Gearing -0.001 * -0.001 -0.054 -0.319
-(1.802) -(0.788) -(0.399) -(1.144)
Age -0.012 *** -0.005 * 0.003 0.001
-(3.463) -(1.732) (0.831) (0.134)
Ln Compensation 0.113 ** 0.122 *** 0.078 * -0.025
(2.235) (2.917) (1.737) -(0.250)
Tobin's Q -0.051 *** -0.059 ***
-(2.693) -(3.852)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations: 8,806 8,806 8,475 8,475 3,217 3,217 3,134 3,134
R-squared: 0.50 0.51 0.51 0.52 0.37 0.80 0.39 0.81
F-statistic: 7.88 8.05 7.88 8.09 2.39 1.78 2.57 1.83
Prob(F-stat): 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of acquisitions Post-acquisition abnormal return
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poor valuation and low CEO compensation. Models (1) and (3) suggest similar results, 
however, in these models CEO age is also associated negatively with the firm’s 
acquisition activity at 1% significance level. Furthermore, I record that firm size and 
acquisitions activity are significant for firm’s post-acquisition abnormal return at 1% 
level in Models (2) and (3), respectively. The association between post-acquisition 
abnormal return and firm size is negative, implying that larger firms destroy more 
shareholder value in mergers and acquisitions than small firms. This evidence is in line 
with the agency theory’s empire building suggesting that executives prefer to manage 
large firms rather than small firms, and therefore they advocate shareholder value 
destroying mergers and acquisitions. 
Based on the results of Table 5 and 6, I accept the third research hypothesis H3 and reject 
the fourth research hypothesis H4. I conclude that female CEOs conduct less mergers and 
acquisitions than male CEOs on average, and that the acquisitions conducted by female 
CEOs offer equal long-term value for shareholders with acquisitions conducted by male 
CEOs on average. The results regarding firm’s acquisition activity, however, is 
considered weak as is not robust for firm specific factors and the difference-in-difference 
approach does not support the results. Furthermore, the result may suffer from 
endogeneity bias as the causality of the relationship is not controlled. Nevertheless, the 
evidence is in line with the previous literature, for example Levi, Li and Zhang (2014) 
and Huang and Kisgen (2013). The evidence regarding female CEOs and post-
acquisitions abnormal return is rejected as it is not robust time fixed effects. To the best 
of my knowledge, the previous literature does not consider CEO gender’s impact on the 
long-term post-acquisition stock performance. 
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Table 6 presents the results of panel data regressions of acquisition activity and post-acquisition 
abnormal return. Acquisition activity is measured as the number of completed mergers and 
acquisitions during a calendar year. Post-acquisition abnormal return is calculated by applying 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) model, and it is defined as the difference between the 
total return of event firm i and the total return of a non-event firm portfolio matched with event 
firm i. I match non-event firms with event firms based on the companies’ annual market 
capitalization, book-to-market ratio and one year past share price performance. Abnormal return 
is calculated from the two-year period after the acquisition. Numbers in parentheses indicate 
White cross-section t-statistics. Statistically significant differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels are indicated. 
 
Table 6. Panel data regressions of acquisition activity and post-acquisition abnormal 
return. 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
C -2.615 *** -3.675 *** -3.656 *** 0.054 8.147 *** -0.026
-(8.958) -(7.210) -(12.063) (0.256) (5.044) -(0.117)
Female CEO -0.159 -0.125 -0.199 ** -0.142 -0.178 -0.144
-(1.603) -(1.081) -(2.009) -(1.472) -(0.846) -(1.492)
ROA 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 0.005 *** 0.002 -0.001 0.002
(5.315) (4.338) (4.696) (0.937) -(0.337) (0.929)
Ln Mcap 0.275 *** 0.290 *** 0.321 ***
(30.580) (10.102) (32.911)
Ln Sales -0.018 -0.556 *** -0.019
-(1.207) -(5.090) -(1.275)
Tobin's Q -0.001 -0.067 ** -0.074 ***
-(0.067) -(2.276) -(5.242)
Gearing -0.014 ** -0.001 -0.011 ** -0.012 0.097 0.006
-(1.963) -(1.384) -(2.083) -(0.141) (0.448) (0.068)
Age -0.011 *** -0.002 -0.010 *** -0.002 -0.007 -0.002
-(6.486) -(0.599) -(6.466) -(0.782) -(1.118) -(0.780)
Ln Compensation 0.031 0.096 *** 0.005 0.030 0.064 0.033
(0.831) (4.031) (0.134) (1.029) (0.996) (1.130)
No. of acquisitions 0.015 *** 0.009 0.015 ***
(3.189) (0.890) (3.072)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations: 11,901 11,901 11,901 4,899 4,899 4,899
R-squared: 0.08 0.55 0.12 0.46 0.73 0.46
F-statistic: 59.92 7.75 77.34 1.19 1.75 1.19
Prob(F-stat): 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
No. of acquisitions Post-acquisition abnormal return
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5.3. Female CEOs and corporate risk-taking 
Table 7 presents the results of difference-in-differences regression analysis of firm 
leverage, measured as debt ratio and gearing. Models (1) and (2) present the difference-
in-differences regressions with time and firm fixed effects without control variables. 
Models (3) and (4) present the corresponding regressions with additional executive and 
firm specific controls for firm profitability, size, valuation level, CEO’s age and CEO’s 
total compensation. 
 
Table 7 presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions of debt ratio and gearing. 
Debt ratio is defined as total debt to total assets, and gearing ratio as long-term debt to total capital 
employed. Numbers in parentheses indicate White cross-section t-statistics. Statistically 
significant differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels are indicated. 
 
Table 7 implies that there is no statistically significant relationship between CEO’s gender 
and firm leverage. CEO’s gender is only significant for firm’s debt ratio when time fixed 
effects are not controlled. In such case, female CEOs are associated with more 
conservative capital structure at 1% significance level. The After* Female coefficient in 
debt ratio’s Model (3) suggests that firms in which a female CEO has followed a male 
Table 7. Difference-in-differences regressions of firm leverage. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
C 0.264 *** 0.262 *** 0.075 0.808 *** 0.303 *** 0.339 *** -0.140 -0.027
(98.526) (122.061) (1.575) (13.785) (6.141) (7.448) -(0.138) -(0.022)
After 0.003 0.002 0.005 0.004 0.055 -0.004 0.009 -0.044
(0.622) (0.580) (1.144) (0.878) (1.190) -(0.046) (0.105) -(0.372)
After*Female -0.031 *** 0.015 -0.033 *** 0.008 -0.066 -0.065 -0.051 -0.048
-(6.709) (1.521) -(7.854) (1.108) -(0.575) -(0.563) -(0.420) -(0.398)
ROA -0.001 -0.002 *** -0.003 -0.002
-(1.019) -(4.576) -(0.894) -(0.812)
Ln Mcap -0.003 * -0.039 *** 0.053 0.054
-(1.687) -(12.039) (0.544) (0.493)
Tobin's Q 0.011 * 0.002 0.002 0.004
(1.737) (0.507) (0.081) (0.149)
Age -0.001 *** 0.000 -0.003 -0.004
-(4.069) (0.560) -(0.469) -(0.587)
Ln Compensation 0.039 *** 0.004 -0.018 -0.024
(4.896) (0.546) -(0.702) -(1.049)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 7,641 7,641 7,419 7,419 8,738 8,738 8,475 8,475
R-squared 0.01 0.80 0.02 0.82 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06
F-statistic 8.80 28.17 11.09 30.47 0.50 0.50 0.47 0.47
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Debt ratio Gearing
52 
 
 
CEO have 3.3 percentage points lower debt ratio than firms in which a male CEO has 
followed another male CEO. That is, female CEOs tend to decrease firms’ debt ratio on 
average. However, after controlling for time specific factors the effect dilutes 
insignificant and turns positive. 
In addition to CEO gender, CEO age and total compensation are also significant for firm’s 
debt ratio. However, this is true only when time fixed effects are not controlled. CEO’s 
age is negatively associated with firm’s debt ratio at 1% significance level implying that 
a firm with one year older CEO has on average 0.1 percentage point lower debt ratio than 
a firm with younger CEO. Furthermore, CEO’s total compensation is positively 
associated with the firm’s debt ratio at 1% significance level. After controlling for time 
fixed effects, only firm profitability and size are statistically significant for debt ratios at 
1% level. Both control variables are negatively associated with the debt ratio implying 
that large and profitable firms tend to be less indebted than small firms with poor 
profitability. 
Interestingly, all After*Female coefficients and all other independent variables are 
insignificant for firm’s gearing ratio, with and without time fixed effects. The results 
imply that firms in which a female CEO has followed a male CEO do not have 
significantly different gearing ratio than firms in which a male CEO has followed another 
male CEO. In other words, neither CEO gender nor firm and executive specific controls 
have impact on firm’s gearing ratio. This might be because the equations do not capture 
firm’s gearing variability well as suggested by the equations’ low F-statistics. 
Table 8 presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions of ROA and net 
income volatility. All After*Female coefficients are statistically significant on at least 
10% level, and negatively associated with both ROA and net income volatility. This 
finding implies that CEO’s gender has explanatory power over firm’s risk level measured 
as earnings volatility. The effect is robust for time fixed effects.  
For example, the After*Female coefficient of ROA volatility Model (4) in Table 8, 
indicates that firms which have experienced a male-to-female CEO transition have on 
average 0.9 percentage point lower ROA volatility than firms that have experienced a 
male-to-male CEO transition instead. The result suggests that after the new female CEO 
has been in office at least two years, the firm’s earnings volatility decreases significantly.  
The net income volatility column suggests also similar results – after the new female CEO 
has been in office at least two years, the net income volatility decreases on average by 
173.8 percentage points. I conjecture that the decrease in net income volatility is more 
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dramatic than in ROA volatility because ROA is less volatile for two reasons. First, ROA 
is defined as the ratio between net income and total assets implying that a change in net 
income is smaller for ROA than for pure net income figure. Second, the increase 
(decrease) in net income also increases (decreases) the total assets through retained 
earnings diluting the change in ROA even further.  
 
Table 8 presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions of ROA volatility and net 
income volatility. ROA and net income volatility are defined as the standard deviation of 
logarithmic changes of ROA and net income, respectively. Numbers in parentheses indicate 
White cross-section t-statistics. Statistically significant differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 
10% (*) levels are indicated. 
 
Table 9 presents the results of panel data regressions of firm leverage measured as debt 
ratio and gearing. Model (1) includes time fixed effects, Model (2) time and firm fixed 
effects, as well as Model (3) time and industry fixed effects. Table 9 indicates that the 
relationship between female CEOs and firm leverage is positive. I record that the Female 
CEO coefficients of Models (1) and (3) are statistically significant for firm leverage at 
1% level. This implies that firms with a female CEO have higher leverage than firms with 
Table 8. Difference-in-differences regressions of earnings volatility. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
C 0.018 *** 0.015 *** 0.203 *** 0.122 * 2.256 *** 3.101 *** 18.411 28.922 **
(7.092) (5.928) (3.709) (1.719) (5.750) (7.401) (1.542) (2.413)
After 0.009 *** 0.014 *** 0.011 *** 0.017 *** 1.649 ** 0.278 2.095 *** 0.533
(2.953) (3.538) (2.826) (3.125) (2.381) (0.396) (3.778) (0.883)
After*Female -0.011 *** -0.011 *** -0.009 ** -0.009 ** -2.231 *** -2.126 *** -1.846 ** -1.738 **
-(3.403) -(3.270) -(2.506) -(2.427) -(3.325) -(2.935) -(2.570) -(2.239)
ROA -0.001 * -0.001 * -0.257 ** -0.252 **
-(1.678) -(1.872) -(2.354) -(2.397)
Ln Mcap -0.009 ** -0.005 -1.574 ** -1.990 **
-(2.563) -(1.156) -(2.158) -(2.540)
Gearing 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.086 0.081
(4.005) (5.048) (1.599) (1.612)
Tobin's Q 0.006 *** 0.006 *** 1.804 ** 1.851 **
(3.746) (4.200) (2.438) (2.523)
Age 0.000 0.001 * 0.108 ** 0.069
(1.527) (1.750) (2.302) (1.446)
Ln Compensation -0.011 * -0.010 * -0.095 -0.299
-(1.929) -(1.743) -(0.121) -(0.410)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations 8,622 8,622 8,403 8,403 8,735 8,735 8,468 8,468
R-squared 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.18 0.18 0.19 0.19
F-statistic 2.09 2.09 2.10 2.09 1.71 8.19 1.74 1.74
Prob(F-stat) 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROA volatility Net income volatility
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a male CEO, on average, after adjusting for time and industry specific factors. The 
relationship, however, turns negative and statistically insignificant when the firm fixed 
effects are controlled instead of industry fixed effects. By including firm fixed effects to 
the model, the equation’s R-squared increases from 0% to 6%. Nevertheless, all three 
models have low F-statistic values implying that the models do not capture well the 
variability of firm leverage.  
 
Table 9 presents the results of panel data regressions of debt ratio and gearing. Debt ratio is 
defined as total debt to total assets, and gearing ratio as long-term debt to total capital employed. 
Numbers in parentheses indicate White cross-section t-statistics. Statistically significant 
differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels are indicated. 
 
Table 10 presents the results of panel data regressions of firm’s earnings volatility 
measured as the volatility of ROA and net income volatility. Models (1) and (3) suggest 
that female CEOs are associated negatively with ROA volatility at 1% significance level. 
The results imply that when a firm has a female CEO, its ROA volatility is, on average, 
0.8 and 0.7 percentage point lower than a firm’s that has a male CEO, respectively. 
Table 9. Panel data regressions of firm leverage. 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
C -0.472 *** -0.120 -0.494 *** -0.019 0.507 0.121
-(5.855) -(0.172) -(6.767) -(0.205) (0.501) (1.204)
Female CEO 0.048 *** -0.012 0.049 *** 0.095 *** -0.039 0.091 ***
(3.596) -(0.259) (3.788) (4.150) -(0.628) (4.257)
ROA -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002
-(0.909) -(1.077) -(0.887) -(0.792) -(1.236) -(0.816)
Ln Mcap 0.009 0.021 0.010 -0.005 0.003 -0.011
(1.351) (0.369) (1.478) -(0.563) (0.043) -(1.292)
Tobin's Q -0.002 0.002 -0.003 0.022 * 0.025 0.033 **
-(0.279) (0.117) -(0.473) (1.836) (1.308) (2.561)
Age -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.001 ** -0.002 -0.001
-(1.472) -(0.597) -(1.448) -(2.014) -(0.486) -(1.512)
Ln Compensation 0.065 *** -0.012 0.066 *** 0.073 *** -0.016 0.082 ***
(4.263) -(0.826) (4.380) (2.737) -(0.978) (3.235)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations 14,451 14,451 14,451 11,901 11,901 11,901
R-squared 0.00 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.06 0.00
F-statistic 0.78 0.47 0.68 1.20 0.41 1.47
Prob(F-stat) 0.71 1.00 0.85 0.26 1.00 0.08
Debt ratio Gearing
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However, the association turns positive and statistically insignificant after firm specific 
factors are controlled. By including firm fixed effects to the model, the equation’s R-
squared increases from 1% to 21%. Table 10 suggests also that CEO’s gender does not 
have explanatory power over firm’s net income volatility. Furthermore, the insignificant 
firm fixed effects Female CEO coefficients in Tables 9 and Table 10 imply that the 
difference-in-differences approach does not ignore any significant information by leaving 
the female-to-female and female-to-male transitions firms out of the sample.  
 
Table 10 presents the results of panel data regressions of ROA volatility and net income volatility. 
ROA and net income volatility are defined as the standard deviation of logarithmic changes of 
ROA and net income, respectively. Numbers in parentheses indicate White cross-section t-
statistics. Statistically significant differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels are 
indicated. 
 
Table 10. Panel data regressions of earnings volatility. 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
C 0.113 *** 0.183 ** 0.108 *** 8.109 ** 26.030 ** 8.069 *
(6.074) (2.316) (5.683) (1.997) (2.515) (1.864)
Female CEO -0.008 *** 0.002 -0.007 *** -0.652 0.307 -0.625
-(3.535) (0.727) -(3.263) -(0.959) (0.282) -(0.920)
ROA -0.001 ** -0.001 -0.001 ** -0.211 *** -0.194 ** -0.211 ***
-(2.180) -(1.327) -(2.162) -(2.949) -(2.123) -(2.981)
Ln Mcap -0.004 *** -0.010 ** -0.004 *** -0.666 *** -1.367 ** -0.657 ***
-(5.353) -(2.078) -(4.763) -(4.196) -(2.000) -(4.072)
Tobin's Q 0.003 0.006 *** 0.002 1.027 * 1.042 ** 1.037 *
(1.600) (3.882) (1.306) (1.891) (2.154) (1.910)
Gearing 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.053 0.071 * 0.059
(2.858) (4.975) (3.549) (1.568) (1.847) (1.634)
Age -0.001 *** -0.001 ** -0.001 *** -0.006 -0.018 -0.010
-(3.498) -(2.307) -(3.495) -(0.348) -(0.446) -(0.553)
Ln Compensation 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.711 -0.324 0.622
(1.172) (0.268) (0.568) (1.317) -(0.458) (1.172)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations: 11,745 11,745 11,745 11,889 11,889 11,889
R-squared: 0.01 0.21 0.01 0.01 0.22 0.01
F-statistic: 9.05 1.69 7.82 5.02 1.77 4.71
Prob(F-stat): 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ROA volatility Net income volatility
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Based on evidence presented in Tables 7 and 9, I conclude that firms with a female CEO 
are as leveraged as firms with a male CEO on average, and thus, I reject the fifth research 
hypothesis H5. I reject the fifth hypothesis as I find weak and ambiguous evidence on 
CEO gender’s effect on firm leverage. I consider the evidence weak and ambiguous, as it 
not robust for the alternative panel data regression Model (2) and it is inconsistent with 
the difference-in-differences approach when time fixed effects are not controlled. 
Furthermore, panel data regressions’ F-statistics are significantly low. This conclusion 
contradicts with the previous literature, for example Faccio et al. (2016), who conclude 
that firms with a female CEO are associated with lower leverage. I conjecture that I may 
find contradicting results relatively to Faccio et al. (2016) as I study only large, publicly 
traded U.S. firms, while Faccio et al. (2016) focus on private European firms. 
Furthermore, they investigate significantly larger sample with different empirical 
methodologies – probit regression and instrumental variable approach (Faccio et al. 
2016). The sample of Faccio et al. (2016) consists of 338,397 firm-year observations.  
Nevertheless, the evidence regarding gender’s impact on firm’s earnings volatility 
supports the evidence of Faccio et al. (2016), despite the different samples and empirical 
methodologies. I find that female CEOs are associated negatively and significantly with 
firm’s earnings volatility, and that the evidence is robust for firm’s industry and time 
fixed effects. Therefore, I conclude that firms with a female CEO have less volatile 
earnings than firms with a male CEO on average, and hence, I accept the sixth research 
hypothesis H6. 
5.4. Female CEOs and valuation 
Table 11 presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions of Tobin’s Q and 
two-year abnormal share price return. The table suggests that CEO’s gender has no impact 
on firm’s valuation level measured as Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, the table suggests that 
CEO’s gender does not have explanatory power over the firm’s long-term share price 
performance as all the After*Female coefficients in Table 11 are insignificant.  
Instead, firm’s profitability and CEO’s compensation have explanatory power over firm’s 
Tobin’s Q, as well as firm’s profitability and size have explanatory power over long-term 
abnormal return. Firm’s profitability is associated positively with both dependent 
variables, while CEO compensation is associated positively with Tobin’s Q and firm’s 
size is associated negatively with the abnormal return. That is, profitable firms with well 
compensated CEOs tend to offer higher shareholder return and have higher valuation than 
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firms that are less profitable and which CEOs have lower compensation, on average. The 
table indicates that when a firm’s ROA increases by one percentage point, its abnormal 
share price return increases by 0.4 percentage point on average. Furthermore, the table 
suggests that smaller companies tend to have higher abnormal return than larger 
companies. These findings are robust for time fixed effects. Firm’s profitability and 
CEO’s compensation are found to be significant for firm’s Tobin’s Q at 1% significance 
level, and firm size is found to be significant for firm’s share price performance at 1% 
significance level. 
 
Table 11 presents the results of difference-in-differences regressions of Tobin’s Q and two-year 
abnormal share price return. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of capital divided 
by the book value of assets. The market value of capital is a sum of market value of equity minus 
deferred taxes, plus book value of debt. Abnormal share price return is calculated by applying 
Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) model, and it is defined as the difference between the 
total return of firm i and the total return of a peer firm portfolio matched with firm i. I match firms 
with their peer firm portfolios based on the companies’ annual market capitalization, book-to-
market ratio and one year past share price performance. Numbers in parentheses indicate White 
cross-section t-statistics. Statistically significant differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% 
(*) levels are indicated. 
 
Table 11. Difference-in-differences regressions of firm valuation. 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (1) (2) (3) (4)
C 1.599 *** 1.600 *** 3.416 * 4.348 *** 0.036 -0.001 5.229 *** 6.817 ***
(13.267) (77.540) (1.751) (2.631) (1.478) -(0.053) (6.027) (4.357)
After -0.035 -0.037 0.051 -0.024 -0.054 *** 0.005 -0.009 0.000
-(0.322) -(1.026) (0.523) -(0.643) -(3.775) (0.284) -(0.597) -(0.005)
After*Female -0.034 -0.031 -0.061 -0.061 -0.116 -0.110 -0.148 -0.126
-(0.457) -(0.413) -(1.088) -(1.081) -(0.598) -(0.571) -(0.711) -(0.631)
ROA 0.022 *** 0.020 *** 0.004 ** 0.004 *
(5.952) (4.887) (1.977) (1.679)
Ln Sales -0.172 -0.207 *
-(1.492) -(1.865)
Ln Assets -0.362 *** -0.479 ***
-(5.455) -(4.066)
Gearing 0.002 0.002 0.313 0.444 *
(1.163) (1.154) (1.558) (1.827)
Age 0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001
(0.342) -(0.479) -(0.897) -(0.667)
Ln Compensation 0.064 ** 0.028 *** 0.008 0.024
(2.328) (3.299) (0.264) (0.680)
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time fixed effects No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
Observations: 8,681 8,681 8,475 8,475 8,681 8,681 8,475 8,475
R-squared: 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.75 0.70 0.73 0.73 0.75
F-statistic: 18.20 20.37 20.10 22.21 18.20 20.37 20.10 22.21
Prob(F-stat): 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tobin's Q Abnormal return
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Table 12 presents the results of panel data regressions of Tobin’s Q and two-year 
abnormal share price return. Table 12 suggests that CEO’s gender has statistically 
significant relationship with the firm’s valuation level measured as Tobin’s Q when time 
and industry fixed effects are controlled. Models (1) and (3) indicate that firms with a 
female CEO are valuated on relatively lower level than firms with a male CEO. For 
example, Model (3) suggests that female-led firms have 0.14 multiples lower Tobin’s Q 
than male-led firms. This finding is significant at 1% significance level, however, it is not 
robust for firm specific factors. When firms fixed effects are included into the equation 
instead of industry fixed effects, the relationship becomes statistically insignificant, yet it 
remains negative. I consider the evidence weak as it is not robust for firm specific factors, 
and because the difference-in-difference approach does not support the evidence. In 
addition to CEO gender, firm’s profitability and compensation are also associated 
positively with Tobin’s Q at 1% significance level. Moreover, firm’s size and CEO age 
are associated negatively with the firm’s valuation level at 1% significance levels. 
Furthermore, the Table 12 indicates that firms with a female CEO have on average 6.8 
percentage points higher two-year total shareholder return than their peer companies with 
a male CEO. This finding is statistically significant at 10% level when firm’s profitability, 
size, leverage, as well as CEO’s age and compensation are controlled. Firm’s profitability, 
size and leverage are also found significant for firm’s two-year abnormal share price 
return at 1%, 1% and 10% significance levels, respectively. 
Based on the evidence presented in Table 11 and 12, I accept the seventh research 
hypothesis H7 and reject the eighth research hypothesis H8. I record weak evidence on 
that firms with a female CEO have lower Tobin’s Q than firms with a male CEO, when 
time and industry fixed effects are controlled. Furthermore, I document weak evidence of 
a positive relationship between female CEOs and firms’ long-term stock price return. The 
findings however may suffer from endogeneity bias, and hence, the causality might be 
reversed. That is, firms with a female CEO may have lower Tobin’s Q and higher long-
term stock price return than firms with a male CEO because of the CEO’s gender, or 
alternatively, because firms with lower Tobin’s Q and higher stock returns tend to attract 
more female CEOs than male CEOs. Insignificant difference-in-differences coefficients 
support the later explanation assuming the approach captures all significant information. 
However, it might be also that female-to-female and female-to-male observations that are 
excluded from the difference-differences sample have statistically significant explanatory 
power over the firm’s long-term stock price performance.  
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Table 12 presents the results of panel data regressions of Tobin’s Q and two-year abnormal share 
price return. Tobin’s Q is defined as the ratio of the market value of capital divided by the book 
value of assets. The market value of capital is a sum of market value of equity minus deferred 
taxes, plus book value of debt. Abnormal share price return is calculated by applying Buy and 
Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) model, and it is defined as the difference between the total return 
of firm i and the total return of a peer firm portfolio matched with firm i. I match firms with their 
peer firm portfolios based on the companies’ annual market capitalization, book-to-market ratio 
and one year past share price performance. Numbers in parentheses indicate White cross-section 
t-statistics. Statistically significant differences at the 1% (***), 5% (**), and 10% (*) levels are 
indicated. 
 
 
The empirical evidence regarding Tobin’s Q is in line with the evidence of Adams and 
Ferreira (2009), Dobbin and Jung (2010) and Haslam et al. (2010). Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) and Dobbin and Jung (2010) document that board diversity is negatively 
associated with firm’s Tobin’s Q, and Haslam et al. (2010) find that firms with female 
directors trade on discount relative to firms with male directors. Furthermore, the 
evidence of Krishnan and Parson (2008) supports my evidence of female CEOs’ positive 
association with long-term stock performance. Krishnan and Parson (2008) conclude that 
(1) (2) (3) (1) (2) (3)
C 3.887 *** 3.714 *** 3.311 *** 0.146 5.929 *** 0.195 **
(18.790) (3.475) (16.820) (1.295) (5.788) (2.191)
Female CEO -0.121 *** -0.029 -0.138 *** -0.010 0.068 * -0.024
-(2.600) -(0.711) -(2.897) -(0.255) (1.699) -(0.645)
ROA 0.045 *** 0.020 *** 0.044 *** 0.004 *** 0.001 0.004 ***
(6.762) (5.846) (6.903) (4.033) (0.225) (3.545)
Ln Assets -0.154 *** -0.175 ** -0.144 *** -0.031 * -0.430 *** -0.032 **
-(13.469) -(2.296) -(14.471) -(1.820) -(5.490) -(2.057)
Gearing 0.008 0.002 0.010 0.007 0.288 * -0.005
(1.040) (1.341) (1.077) (0.150) (1.647) -(0.094)
Age -0.010 *** 0.002 -0.011 *** 0.000 0.002 -0.001
-(6.728) (1.601) -(7.851) -(0.227) (1.254) -(0.346)
Ln Compensation 0.029 ** 0.017 0.033 *** 0.046 0.038 0.051
(2.272) (0.919) (3.181) (1.354) (1.283) (1.617)
Time fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm fixed effects No Yes No No Yes No
Industry fixed effects No No Yes No No Yes
Observations: 11,900 11,900 11,900 9,796 9,796 9,796
R-squared: 0.20 0.76 0.23 0.01 0.27 0.01
F-statistic: 191.12 20.20 180.22 5.00 2.30 5.57
Prob(F-stat): 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Tobin's Q Abnormal return
Table 12. Panel data regressions of firm valuation. 
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firms with more female executives tend to have higher stock returns after an IPO than 
companies with fewer female executives. 
Summary of the empirical results 
Table 13 summarises the main female CEO coefficients of the study regressions. 
Columns (1) and (2) present the After*Female coefficients of difference-in-differences 
regressions. Column (1) includes only firm fixed effects, while column (2) includes both 
firm and time fixed effects. Columns (3) and (4) present the Female CEO coefficients of 
panel data regressions. Column (3) includes firm and time fixed effects, while column (4) 
includes industry and time fixed effects.  
The main empirical methodology of this study, difference-in-differences approach, 
suggests that female CEOs are associated with  
(i) higher profitability measured as ROA,  
(ii) lower post-acquisition stock price return,  
(iii) lower risk level in terms of earnings volatility and 
(iv) lower risk level in terms of leverage.  
In addition, panel data regressions suggest that female CEOs are associated with 
(i) lower acquisition activity, 
(ii) higher risk level in terms of leverage, 
(iii) higher long-term stock price return and  
(iv) lower valuation level measured as Tobin’s Q.  
The evidence regarding female CEOs, ROA and earning volatility is robust for firm and 
time fixed effects. Furthermore, the panel data regressions support the earnings volatility 
findings, however, only when industry specific factors are controlled instead of firm 
specific factors. Based on this evidence, I accept the second and sixth research hypotheses 
H2 and H6, and conclude that firms with a female CEO have higher overall profitability 
measured as ROA and lower earnings volatility than firms with a male CEO, on average.  
Interestingly, I document also that female CEOs are not associated with higher 
operational profitability, EBITD on total assets, even though CEO’s gender is associated 
with the firm’s overall profitability, ROA. This finding suggests that the difference 
between female and male CEOs’ performance may result from three income statement 
items in which EBITD on total assets and ROA deviate from each other: interest, taxes 
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and depreciations. Based on this evidence, I reject the first research hypothesis H1, and 
conclude that CEO gender has no impact on firm’s operational profitability. 
The evidence regarding gender’s association with acquisitions activity, long-term 
abnormal return and valuation level is significant only with panel data regression when 
firm or industry fixed effects are controlled. I consider the findings weak as they are not 
robust for neither the alternative panel data regression model nor the difference-in-
difference approach. Furthermore, the evidence might suffer from endogeneity bias, since 
the panel data regression does not consider the causality between the dependent and 
independent variables. Nevertheless, I conclude that firms with a female CEO conduct 
less acquisitions, generate higher long-term shareholder return and that their valuation 
level is on discount relative to firms with a male CEO. Furthermore, I conclude that firms 
with a female CEO are as leveraged as firms with a male CEO since I record ambiguous 
and weak evidence of the relation between gender and leverage. That is, I accept the third 
and seventh research hypotheses H3 and H7, and reject fifth and eighth research 
hypotheses H5 and H8. 
Finally, I document a negative relationship between female CEOs and post-acquisition 
stock price return. However, the evidence is not robust for time fixed effects, and 
therefore I reject the fourth research hypothesis H4. Thus, I conclude that CEO gender 
has no impact on firm’s long-term post-acquisition abnormal return. 
62 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 13. Summary of female CEO coefficients. 
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Profitability
EBITD on TA 0.011 0.011 0.006 -0.002
ROA 0.015 ** 0.014 ** 0.005 0.002
Mergers and acquisitions
No. of acquisitions 0.093 0.102 -0.125 -0.199 **
Post-acquisition abnormal return -0.289 *** -0.215 -0.178 -0.144
Corporate risk-taking
Debt ratio -0.033 *** 0.008 -0.012 0.049 ***
Gearing -0.051 -0.048 -0.039 0.091 ***
ROA volatility -0.009 ** -0.009 ** 0.002 -0.007 ***
Net income volatility -1.846 ** -1.738 ** 0.307 -0.625
Valuation
Abnormal return -0.148 -0.126 0.068 * -0.024
Tobin's Q -0.061 -0.061 -0.029 -0.138 ***
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes No
Time fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Industry fixed effects No No No Yes
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Difference-in-
differences
Panel data regression
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6. CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this thesis is to study differences between female and male CEOs and to 
examine whether CEO’s gender has explanatory power over firm performance. The study 
considers firm performance from four different perspectives – profitability, mergers and 
acquisitions, risk-taking and valuation. The study focuses on S&P 1500 firms during the 
period of January 2005-December 2015, and applies the difference-in-differences 
approach as the main methodology of the empirical research. 
The empirical evidence of this thesis suggests that firms with a female CEO have higher 
overall profitability than firms with a male CEO on average. I measure firm’s overall 
profitability as return on assets, ROA. The finding is robust for firm and time fixed 
effects, and it is in line with the prior empirical evidence, for example Khan and Vieito 
(2013).  
Interestingly, I document also that female CEOs are not associated with higher 
operational profitability, measured as EBITD on total assets, even though CEO’s gender 
is associated with the firm’s overall profitability. This finding suggests that the difference 
between female and male CEOs’ performance may result from the three income statement 
items in which ROA and EBITD on total assets deviate from each other: interest, taxes 
and depreciations. That is, female CEOs are as efficient as male CEOs to use their firm 
resources, such as labour force and raw materials, however, there are some material 
differences between female and male CEOs when considering firm’s financial costs, 
taxation and depreciation policies.  
The test of mean differences suggests that firms with a female CEO are less leveraged. 
By assuming that less leveraged firms have also lower financing costs, the finding 
supports the conjecture that female CEOs are associated with higher overall firm 
profitability due to their firms’ lower financing costs. However, by applying traditional 
panel data regression, I record also that firms with a female CEO are, in contrast, more 
leveraged than firms with a male CEO. In other words, the evidence is not unambiguous, 
and hence, no comprehensive conclusions can be made without a further research.  
In addition to firm profitability, I document that female CEOs are associated with lower 
corporate risk-taking and acquisition activity. I find that firms with a female CEO have 
lower earnings volatility and they conduct less mergers and acquisitions than firms with 
a male CEO on average. I reason these findings based on the prior empirical evidence of 
females’ greater risk aversion and lower overconfidence (Olsen and Cox 2001; Powell 
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and Ansic 1997; Fehr-Duda et al. 2006; Odean 1999; Huang and Kisgen 2013), as well 
as the possible difference between genders’ tendencies to be hubristic.  
I conjecture that due to females’ greater risk aversion they are more likely to advocate 
investments and projects that offer more stable earnings for the firm, and hence decrease 
the earnings volatility. Furthermore, I conjecture that female CEOs promote less 
acquisitions than male CEOs as they are less overconfident of the acquisition synergies 
and less arrogant of their abilities to run the target company more efficiently than its 
original management, as suggested by Roll’s (1986) Hubris Hypothesis. 
Finally, I record that firms with a female CEO generate higher shareholder return in long-
term and have lower Tobin’s Q than firms with a male CEO, on average. That is, female-
led firms are undervalued by the financial markets even though they are simultaneously 
associated with higher profitability and lower risk level than male-led firms. The evidence 
is in line with the prior empirical evidence, for example Krishnan and Parson (2008) and 
Adams and Ferreira (2009).  
In conclusion, I find that CEO gender has explanatory power over firm performance. I 
record that gender explains firm performance in all four study fields, although the 
evidence regarding acquisition activity, share price performance and valuation is weak 
and may suffer from endogeneity bias. 
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